

A RAND NOTE

MAJOR CRIMES AS ANALOGS TO POTENTIAL THREATS
TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND PROGRAMS

R. N. Reinstedt, Judith Westbury

April 1980

N-1498-SL

Prepared For

Sandia Laboratories



Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE APR 1980		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-00-1980 to 00-00-1980	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Major Crimes as Analogs to Potential Threats to Nuclear Facilities and Programs				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 90406				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES This report replaces ADE750244					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 108	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			

The research described in this note was sponsored by Sandia Laboratories under Contract 46-3195.

The Rand Publications Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

A RAND NOTE

MAJOR CRIMES AS ANALOGS TO POTENTIAL THREATS
TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES AND PROGRAMS

R. N. Reinstedt, Judith Westbury

April 1980

N-1498-SL

Prepared For

Sandia Laboratories



PREFACE

This study is part of an ongoing investigation, sponsored by Sandia Laboratories, of potential and actual criminal adversaries of U.S. nuclear facilities and programs. Because, at the onset of Rand's work on the issue, incidents of crime in the nuclear domain were insufficient to provide a data base for analysis, the development of a surrogate data base of non-nuclear incidents that are analogous in some respects to potential actions against nuclear programs was initiated. One of the categories deemed to provide analogs to nuclear crimes--for example, to the potential penetration of nuclear facilities or the theft of nuclear material--was sophisticated and high-value burglaries, robberies, and other "conventional" crimes, popularly called "capers."

The present Note is a follow-on to a 1976 Rand study of 45 of these high-value crimes as analogs. The data base used combines the 45 crimes previously studied with 76 additional crimes. An analysis of the actions is provided as well as a number of observations about the criminals' methods.

SUMMARY

This Note is part of an ongoing investigation into the important problem of potential and actual criminal adversaries of United States nuclear facilities and programs. Because of the low level of criminal activity against nuclear targets in the United States, The Rand Corporation has employed an analogous methodology to study this subject; that is, Rand developed over several years a surrogate data base consisting of non-nuclear crimes that are analogous in some respects to potential incidents against nuclear facilities and programs.

This Note analyzes a data base of 121 sophisticated and high-value burglaries, robberies and other "conventional" crimes that are in certain respects analogous to as yet uncommitted nuclear crimes. (Data on 45 of these crimes were taken directly from an earlier Rand study and an additional 76 crimes were selected for this document.) Most of the information comes from newspaper and journal articles, and is subject to their errors and limitations. There is also a variance in the amount of data on each crime; some "popular" crimes were covered thoroughly by the media but other crimes had very little reported. While it would have been preferable to have had data on every crime that followed it from inception through trial, in reality such data are rarely available. Furthermore, as Rand has developed this data base over the years, it has gradually been gathering more data over a wider range of areas; i.e., the newer the data the more all-encompassing they are. This led to a more thorough analysis of the 76 crimes gathered for this document, simply because they included

more data.

The data base has been analyzed for information such as insider involvement, number of perpetrators, value of loot, type of crime, violence, coercion of employees, and use of deception. From the extrapolated statistics, many inferences and observations were made, but only those pertinent to potential crimes against nuclear facilities and programs are included here. The purpose of this document is not to declare what should be done by those responsible for the security of nuclear facilities and materials, but to emphasize areas of particular vulnerability as observed in the analogous data base.

Among the inferences and observations are the following: the higher the value of the loot the more likely that insiders participated; the higher the value of the loot the more perpetrators are likely to be involved; crimes involving insiders have an unusually high rate of apprehension; insiders can pose a great threat to nuclear security for a variety of reasons and in a number of ways; a high number of crimes occur while loot is in transit; crimes employing deception or coercion are very successful; his authority and/or access often determines whether an insider will use deception; and crimes of coercion usually have as their victims employees with authority and access.

This Note also includes a section that details seven specific crimes from the data base that are particularly analogous to potential nuclear-related crimes and on which considerable data are available.

Synopses of each of the 121 crimes are provided.

CONTENTS

PREFACE.....	iii
SUMMARY.....	v
FIGURES.....	ix
Section	
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. THE DATA.....	3
III. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA.....	8
Combined Data Bases.....	8
Number of Participants vs Type of Crime.....	10
Number of Participants vs Type of Loot.....	10
Number of Participants vs Value of Loot.....	14
Insiders.....	17
Violence.....	20
Day of Week.....	21
Coercions, Deceptions, Hostages and Kidnappings, Unsuccessful Attempts.....	21
IV. OBSERVATIONS PERTINENT TO POTENTIAL NUCLEAR CRIMES.....	28
V. LESSONS FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY: INFERENCES DRAWN FROM THE ANALYSIS.....	30
Deception.....	30
Diversion.....	31
Coercion.....	32
The Insider.....	32
Preference Based on Intrinsic Value or Ease of Conversion.....	33
Economic Motivation.....	34
Political Motivation.....	35
Transportation.....	35
VI. CRIME EXAMPLES APPLICABLE TO POTENTIAL NUCLEAR TARGETS....	37
Hostile Employees.....	37
A Coerced Employee.....	38
An Economically Motivated Insider.....	38
A Crime of Diversion.....	41
Non-economic High-level Penetration Through Deception...	43
A Politically Based Crime for Economic Gain.....	44
A High-technology Insider Crime.....	44
VII. SYNOPSES OF OLD AND NEW DATA BASES.....	49
Old Data Base.....	49
New Data Base.....	57

FIGURES

1. Components common to nuclear and non-nuclear crimes.....	4
2. Combined data bases.....	9
3. Number of participants vs type of crime.....	11
4. Number of participants vs type of loot, I.....	12
5. Participants vs type of loot.....	13
6. Number of participants vs type of loot, II.....	14
7. Participants vs value of loot.....	15
8. Insider/outsider involvement by number of participants....	18
9. Known/suspected insiders by type of target.....	19
10. Guards as insiders.....	20
11. Violence.....	21
12. Incidence level of targets by day of week.....	22

I. INTRODUCTION

At the time of the initiation of Rand's work on the issue of potential and actual criminal adversaries of United States nuclear facilities and programs, the United States had experienced almost no nuclear crime involving energy facilities or programs. It was determined, therefore, to develop a surrogate data base of non-nuclear incidents that would provide analogs for analysis,* for example, to the potential penetration of nuclear facilities or the theft of nuclear material. One of the categories chosen was sophisticated and high-value burglaries, robberies and other "conventional" crimes, popularly called "capers." In a 1976 Rand analysis of 45 of these crimes as analogs, capers were defined as crimes calling for a "task-force" type of assault against well-protected objectives and requiring extensive planning.

In the Introduction to that 1976 work, the authors stated:

The relevance of "capers" to the issue of threats to nuclear programs is clear. U.S. nuclear programs are unlikely to present a particularly soft or easy target. Successful penetration of a nuclear facility or hijacking or theft of nuclear material, therefore, would be likely to require the kind of commitment in time, planning effort, personnel and other resources that would qualify it as a caper. By studying past capers we can get some understanding of the factors which have been involved in this type of crime, and of the lessons which might be learned about possible future threats to nuclear programs.

*The methodology of analyzing analogous incidents has proven to be extremely effective. See Rand Reports, R-2225-SL, Attributes of Potential Criminal Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear Programs, Peter deLeon, Brian Jenkins, Konrad Kellen, Joseph Krofcheck, February 1978; R-2554-SL, Motivations and Possible Actions of Potential Criminal Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear Programs, Gail Bass, Brian Jenkins, Konrad Kellen, Joseph Krofcheck, Geraldine Petty, Robert Reinstedt, David Ronfeldt, February 1980.

This Note describes the results of a follow-on study of those task-force crimes considered to be analogous to potential nuclear-related crimes. The data base for the present investigation consists of the 45 crimes studied in the 1976 analysis, plus an additional 76 crimes. Where possible, analysis was performed on the combined data bases, a total of 121 various crimes.

The criteria for choosing the additional 76 crimes were consistent with those for the original 45 capers. Selection was limited to major crimes that required or reflected a professional approach, and usually required a great deal of planning. The few exceptions to these criteria (in both studies) were incidents that were still clearly analogous to situations representing threats to the nuclear community.

The new data base also contains considerably more detail for each event; therefore, it is expected that the findings (most of which are supportive of the earlier study, or are in entirely new areas) will have more validity both because of the addition of many more crimes and because the data collection capabilities have been greatly enhanced. The early study gathered data after the fact--the decision was made to look at analogous crimes and then the accounts of the crimes were assembled, going back to 1950. However, that study, which called for a follow-on investigation, paved the way to accumulating and maintaining a data base, so that in a relatively short period of time a much larger number of crimes could be added with more detailed descriptions.

II. THE DATA

For the past several years The Rand Corporation has been maintaining a file on high-value crimes, primarily those characterized by considerable planning, use of technology, and in general representing a professional criminal's approach to such things as robberies, burglaries and fraud.

In this document emphasis was placed on non-nuclear crimes that shared components with potential nuclear-related crimes. While analogous events by definition do not track in their entirety on a one-for-one basis, much can be learned by paying careful attention to the individual components of those analogous events that are identical. Many individual components examined in this study of non-nuclear crimes are, of necessity, exactly those that would be present in any scenario involving nuclear crime. Figure 1 shows specific components considered to be common to both non-nuclear crimes and conceivable nuclear crimes. Obviously, it is unlikely that all of the components would ever be present in any given crime. The components listed are intended to encompass most possibilities and so are meant to be comprehensive but not exhaustive.

The components spin off from three factors that are present in every crime, namely "Planning," "Modus Operandi," and "Logistics." One can visualize Planning as being the strategic outline for the (hoped for) successful enactment of the crime--from the original choice of a target, obtaining the loot, and escaping from the scene, to avoiding apprehension. Modus Operandi would deal with the tactical aspects of the crime. It would consist of the "how to" components




Fig. 1 — Components common to nuclear and non-nuclear crimes

required to accomplish the strategic planning. Finally, Logistics would include all of the organizational (administrative) requirements. For example, in many cases transportation is via stolen vehicles and these then have to be provided for. Timing may include having to provide and take advantage of a time "window" when access and egress will coincide with the availability of the loot. Extrinsic loot may need to be converted through a fence (or several fences). Ransomable loot requires communicating messages to the party or parties interested in (re)acquiring the stolen goods.

The authors feel that Figure 1 is equally applicable to major nuclear or non-nuclear crimes.

The present study combines two data bases. As noted above, the first consists of descriptions of 45 crimes and attempted crimes that were assembled for an earlier study. That file ranged from single-person operations to complex crimes involving in excess of a dozen criminals planning together for as long as two years. A list of those crimes is contained in Section VII. The second data base consists of additional crimes and attempted crimes documented since the publication of the earlier study. Although the criteria for selecting analogous crimes did not differ from one data base to the next, intervening studies did point to new considerations for analysis and in some cases a change in emphasis. In addition, because of enhanced data-gathering capabilities, the second data base was more detailed and comprehensive. A list of those crimes comprising the second data base also appears in Section VII.

As mentioned above, studies conducted in the interim provided new areas of interest. These areas understandably were not included in

the earlier study, and the specific data required to do an analysis were, for the most part, not available in the 45-crime data base inasmuch as the areas were not at that time of concern. As a result, analysis reported in the present Note is based primarily on the new (76) crimes. Coercion of employees, an effective and not uncommon criminal tactic, is an example of a new area where data were sought out for analysis. Such information was available only in the new data base.

When possible, the two data bases were combined for analysis.

There are some concerns about the reliability of the data. Almost all cases in the file are accumulated from newspaper and journal stories. As a result, the occasional inaccuracies that invariably occur in such accounts are incorporated into the data base. In many instances only one article is available with no follow-up, so that information is often not complete. Nor is there an opportunity provided to correct any inaccuracies or misconceptions. The ideal data base would be longitudinal in nature, following cases from planning through commitment and apprehension. Few such ideal case studies exist, especially when considering fairly recent crimes.

Not all the crimes provide the data necessary to analyze across the spectrum of areas to be considered. As a consequence, the number of crimes included for each area varies considerably, resulting in reduced data bases. For example, it is not always known how many perpetrators were involved or the amount of the "take." Therefore, when analyzing the relationship between those two factors, several cases will be "unknowns" and the total number of usable cases will be fewer.

By enlarging the number of cases it is expected that both of the above concerns will be alleviated: Occasional inaccuracies will have far less effect and there will be enough total cases to provide a reasonable number of crimes to analyze for each area.

One final point regarding the data concerns the occasional elimination of a specific case when its inclusion would bias the results. The prime example of this is the insider crime (although it was actually a series of crimes) at the Ben-Gurion International Airport in Israel. The total approximate take was \$250,000,000 in diamonds. The next highest take in our data was \$10,250,000. However, this high-value crime was included in certain areas where it did not have an undue influence--for example, extrapolations involving insiders but not loot.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

This section enumerates the statistics that were extrapolated from the two data bases. The areas covered include type of crime, type of target, type and amount of loot, number of participants, insider involvement and use of violence. Sections IV and V detail the conclusions drawn from these statistics.

Combined Data Bases

Figure 2 shows results from combining the old and new data bases. Sixty-six percent of all the crimes took place in the United States. The remaining 34 percent occurred primarily in Canada, England, France, and Germany. We found no great distinctions between crimes committed in the United States and crimes committed elsewhere.

The crimes that fell into the categories of burglary and robbery were about equally divided (45 percent and 47 percent respectively), while "Other" (fraud, etc.) made up 8 percent.

Analysis of the loot shows cash and securities to be the predominant loot taken (58 percent), followed by jewelry and precious metals (20 percent). Thirteen percent of the crimes involved art theft. The "Other" category included prison breaks, penetrating security, and loot consisting of railroad cars, mercury, and weapons. In the cases where more than one type of loot was taken, the predominant one was chosen as the type of loot.

The most popular target was banks (32 percent). This concurs with cash and securities being the most popular loot. (Banks included savings and loans as well as security companies.) The category "Other" represented 26 percent of the targets and ranged from churches being




Fig. 2 — Combined data bases

burglarized of treasures, to armed robberies of airport cargo terminals, to cat burglars stealing valuables from homes on Long Island, New York, and the French Riviera. Twenty-five percent of the targets were vehicular. Although armored and unarmored vehicles were included, most of the crimes were against armored vehicles, undoubtedly because of the take involved. Museums were a target in 12 of the crimes (10 percent), and jewelry was the target 7 percent of the time. Jewelry in this case means specifically a "place" target and not loot, in other words, jewelry stores, diamond factories, etc.

Regarding the number of perpetrators, the number of crimes was essentially the same when 1-3 participants were involved (45 percent) and when 4-7 participants were involved (42 percent). In 13 percent of the crimes there were 8 or more participants.

Number of Participants vs Type of Crime

Figure 3 analyzes the number of perpetrators in relationship to the type of crime. One to 3 participants appeared to prefer robberies --this category had 29 robberies as opposed to 20 burglaries. Eight or more participants also seemed to prefer robberies--they committed 9 robberies and 3 burglaries. This trend reverses in the 4-7 category, which includes 30 burglaries and 18 robberies.

Number of Participants vs Type of Loot

The next two figures, Figures 4 and 5, show the particular loot preferences in relationship to the number of perpetrators. In Figure 4 in the 1-3 participants group, 53 percent of the crimes were aimed at cash as the loot, 23 percent against jewelry, and 17 percent of the crimes were art thefts. The 4-7 participants group designed 51




Fig. 3 - Number of participants vs type of crime




Fig. 4 - Number of participants vs type of loot, I

percent of their crimes to get cash, 21 percent to obtain jewelry, and 7 percent to steal art treasures or objects. The 8 or more participants group primarily sought cash as loot (79 percent) and jewelry as the only other type of loot (21 percent). Once again in all categories cash was the most common take of all, with jewelry second.

Figure 5 has an added column that shows what loot was the target when insiders were involved in the crime. In 30 of the 39 insider cases, cash, once again, was the target. Two cases involved jewelry, and two cases involved art.

Number of cash and securities crimes	28	15	11	30
Number of jewelry crimes	12	6	3	2
Number of art crimes	9	2	0	2
Other	4	6	0	5
	1-3 Participants	4-7 Participants	8 or More Participants	Insider Participants

Fig. 5 — Participants vs type of loot

In 54 of the crimes we were able to determine a fairly exact number of perpetrators. Figure 6 designates the actual number of crimes for each type of loot versus each known number of perpetrators. There are no cases in our data base that include six or more participants engaging in any crime that does not have cash and securities or jewelry as a target (and in fact only one of those cases

has jewelry). The 7 crimes involving the theft of art were all committed with 1-6 participants.

Number of Participants	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	12	20	23
Number of cash and securities crimes	7	8	6	1	3	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	0
Number of jewelry crimes	1	3	4	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Number of art crimes	2	2	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	10	13	11	3	4	4	1	2	2	1	1	1	1

Fig. 6 - Number of participants vs type of loot, II

Number of Participants vs Value of Loot

Figure 7 is a breakdown of the number of perpetrators versus the value of the loot. Because the two data bases from the two studies were easily distinguished, they are shown separately, and then combined. Here again was added a fourth column--insiders as perpetrators. The boxes contain the range of the value of the loot, and then the average take for the number of crimes in each box. There was only one case of an insider in the old data base (where the value of the loot was also known), and the figures contained in that box are not thought to be representative. With the exception of that one "Insider Participants" box, there is a progression in every instance

	1-3 Participants	4-7 Participants	Insider Participants	8 or More Participants
<u>Old data</u>	11 crimes	8 crimes	1 crime	3 crimes
\$ Range	1,000-4,000,000	16,600-4,300,000	4,300,000	115,000-7,000,000
Average \$ value	981,000	1,383,000	4,300,000	2,872,000
<u>New data</u>	34 crimes	13 crimes	35 crimes	8 crimes
\$ Range	12,000-10,250,000*	262,000-3,500,000	82,500-10,250,000	600,000-7,100,000
Average \$ value	1,515,000	1,548,000	2,113,000	3,597,500
<u>Combined data</u>	45 crimes	21 crimes	36 crimes	11 crimes
\$ Range	1,000-10,250,000	16,600-4,300,000	82,500-10,250,000	115,000-7,100,000
Average \$ value	1,384,000	1,485,000	2,232,000	3,739,500

* 1 man, white collar

Fig. 7 — Participants vs value of loot

whereby the value of the loot increases with the number of participants. It should be noted that the average dollar value shown is per crime and not per participant. When the data are examined to yield take per participant, they jump around considerably and fail to show any progression similar to that for total participants.

Figure 7 does not include the unusually large crime of \$250,000,000, which, because of its magnitude, would be the most likely of all the crimes to throw our results off. If we include that crime, we see an even greater increase in value of loot as the number of perpetrators increases. Shown below are the new figures that result from the inclusion of the crime in question (this crime falls under the categories "New Data Base," "Insider Participants" and "8 or More Participants").

	Insider Participants	8 or More Participants
NEW DATA BASE		
(56 Crimes)	36 Crimes	9 Crimes
\$ Range	82,500 - 250,000,000	600,000 - 250,000,000
Average \$ Value	9,057,000	30,976,000
COMBINED DATA BASES		
(79 Crimes)	37 Crimes	12 Crimes
\$ Range	82,000 - 250,000,000	115,000 - 250,000,000
Average \$ Value	8,929,000	23,950,000

Insiders

Figure 8 shows that insiders participated as lone individuals and with every size group (1-3, 4-7, and 8 or more). In those cases where it was possible to discern whether a crime included insiders or definitely did not include them, only the 4-7 participants group showed more cases of only outsiders. In the 1-3 participants group, 22 of 38 crimes involved insiders; in the 8 or more participants group, 7 of 9 cases involved insiders; but of the 17 crimes in the 4-7 participants group, "only" 5 cases included insider help.

Figure 9 shows the target preference when insiders were involved or strongly suspected of having participated. (It should be kept in mind here that we are talking about the number of crimes involving insiders, and not the number of insiders, since some cases involved more than one.) Insiders were involved in every type of crime. Seventeen of the 38 crimes involving insiders targeted banks, while 8 insider crimes had vehicular targets. Another 5 targeted airports.

Figure 10, Guards As Insiders, examines the number of cases when there was a possibility that guards could have participated as insiders. There were 48 crimes involving targets (banks, airports, etc.) that employed guards. Fourteen of these 48 targets were hit with insider crimes. Nine of those 14 (64 percent) were non-guard insider crimes while 5 of the 14 (36 percent) were known to have involved guards as insiders. The result is that while the guarded targets were not particularly susceptible to insider crimes (in this case 29 percent of them were hit), when they were victimized, guards participated over one-third of the time.




Fig. 8 — Insider/outsider involvement by number of participants




Fig. 9 — Known/suspected insiders by type of target

Crimes against targets employing guards	48
Number of above crimes involving insiders	14
Guard insiders	5
Non-guard insiders	9

Fig. 10 — Guards as insiders

Violence

Another area of interest was the crimes involving violence (Fig. 11). These are essentially the robberies in both data bases. Only two crimes from the old data base appeared to involve violence or death or injury in cases of robbery. In 27 of the 45 crimes (from both data bases) in which violence was involved, it was only threatened and no real action took place. Nine crimes involved some show of violence but none resulted in death or injury. In 9 other crimes, death or injury occurred. It is not surprising that perpetrators prefer to threaten violence rather than use it.

● Threatened violence	27 crimes
● Show of violence/no death or injury (Shooting weapon, exploding bomb, scuffling, etc.)	9 crimes
● Death or injury	9 crimes

Fig. 11 — Violence

Day of Week

Figure 12 is a breakout of crimes related to day of the week. Again, there are no particular surprises here. While both burglaries and robberies occurred during the week, only burglaries took place over weekends and holidays. There does not appear to be a particular day of the week (such as Friday when one might expect cash accumulations for the week) when any one target is preferred.

Coercions, Deceptions, Hostages and Kidnappings, Unsuccessful Attempts

Certain other aspects of the data seem to be relevant in the attempt to look at analogies to possible nuclear program and facility threats. For example, the insider problem has been addressed throughout the analysis. It was noted when looking at the insider crimes that several involved coercion; in fact, this turned out to be the case slightly over 20 percent of the time (8 of 39 insider crimes). On the following pages we have listed a summary sentence for each coercive crime. If the reader is interested in more detail, the

	<u>Mon</u>	<u>Tues</u>	<u>Wed</u>	<u>Thurs</u>	<u>Fri</u>	<u>Weekend</u>	<u>Holiday</u>
	5 truck	5 truck	1 truck	5 truck	1 truck	1 truck	
		1 bank	3 bank		4 bank	4 bank	3 bank
	2 airport	1 airport	1 airport				
		1 jewelry		1 jewelry		1 jewelry	
					2 museum	2 museum	1 museum
	2 other		1 other	2 other	2 other	2 other	2 other
Total crimes	9	8	6	8	9	10	6

Fig. 12 — Incidence level of targets by day of week

crime number, also listed, indicates where in Section VII that particular crime can be found.

Another analogy that seems valid is that when security is high, or the commodity not easily accessible, deceptions are often employed, and with a great deal of success. This points out that deception is a particularly effective way to take advantage of a vulnerability--namely that people believe what they see. The deceptions are listed in the same manner as the coercions, along with their corresponding crime numbers.

Encompassing most of the coercions is the similar treatment of hostages and kidnappings. There were 14 known crimes where either hostages were taken for coercive purposes or personnel kidnapped for other purposes. These, too, are listed along with their crime numbers.

It also seemed worthwhile to examine those crimes that, for various reasons, ended in failure. These 13 are listed by a summary sentence and the accompanying crime number.

Coercions

<u>Event</u>	<u>Crime Number</u>
o Diamond factory owner's wife and children threatened.	58
o Bank manager's wife and son held.	64
o Wells Fargo manager's wife and children held.	65
o "Dynamite belt" on bank manager.	66
o Beat up Naval officer for payroll safe combination.	82
o Bank manager's wife and daughter held.	109
o Bank president's wife threatened.	115
o "Explosive jock" on bank manager.	120

Deceptions

<u>Event</u>	<u>Crime Number</u>
o In the Great Brink's Robbery, the thieves wore uniforms resembling those of Brink's guards.	1
o A robber dressed as a policeman flagged down a truck carrying \$1.5 million.	10
o Robbers posed as telephone workers to gain entrance to an airport cargo building.	34
o Las Vegas coin thieves set up a phoney change cage to exchange the money for paper currency.	47
o Bank tunnelers used deception to obtain blueprints of the bank.	51
o Paris bank burglars wore sewer uniforms while digging a tunnel from the sewer to the vault.	52
o Bank burglars tunneled from the building across the street, renting it ostensibly for a "carpet business."	57
o Two men pretended to be jewelry appraisers to gain access to jewels up for bid.	59
o Men wearing security uniforms and firing blanks robbed a department store.	68
o Irish bandits painted vans in county council colors to divert traffic.	72

- o A robber tried gaining access to a museum by claiming to be a relief guard (failed). 76
- o Jewel robbers pretended to be reporters to gain access to a new store. 80
- o To effect a wire transfer fraud, the thief pretended to be a bank officer, and also set up a new business under false pretenses. 81
- o Bank robbers rented a helicopter under false pretenses. 92
- o A "boiler-room" operation sold gold futures, telling investors gold would be delivered by a nonexistent bank. 94
- o A reporter broke White House security by posing as a congressman. 96
- o Thieves posed as deliverymen and robbed an ambassador's mansion of art works. 102
- o To effect a wire transfer fraud, a brokerage firm was to be deceived into exchanging the "loot on paper" for bearer bonds (failed). 103
- o A security guard disarmed his fellow guards by offering to clean their guns, then robbed their company. 108
- o Two people asked for a jewelry appraisal, then robbed the jewelry store (alleged--police feared the owner staged a phoney robbery). 110
- o A bank robber asked to rent a deposit box to gain access to the vault. 111
- o Armored truck robbers stole a company truck to gain access to the parking area. 112
- o Robbers stole a delivery truck and wore uniforms, enabling them to load loot inconspicuously. 116
- o One robber dressed as a security guard during a jewelry store holdup. 119

Hostages and Kidnappings

<u>Event</u>	<u>Crime Number</u>
o A Brink's armored truck driver was taken by robbers who hijacked his truck.	48
o A driver and guard were forced out of their truck (which was then hijacked) and into a car, driven around town, and then let out.	56
o A diamond factory owner was forced by a gunman to drive his own car to the factory.	58
o Gunmen held a bank manager's wife and son in an unsuccessful attempt to rob the bank.	64
o Gunmen seized the family of a Wells Fargo branch manager in order to rob the branch.	65
o During a Brink's van robbery, gunmen hijacked a lorry, forced the driver to drive home, and tied up his family.	72
o Two gunmen hijacked a messenger-service station wagon, taking the driver and his assistant with them.	75
o When hijacking a truck, gunmen handcuffed and taped the driver, and took him with them.	88
o Gunmen held a bank manager's wife and daughter to force the manager to let them in the bank.	109
o During a Brink's truck robbery, gunmen handcuffed the driver and a passerby, and drove off with them in another truck.	112
o A gunman held a bank president, his business associate, and his wife and two children in order to rob the bank.	115
o During a jewelry robbery, two men hijacked a truck, tied up the driver, and transferred her into another vehicle.	116
o After robbing a bank, a thief forced the manager to drive away with him.	120
o During a shipyard robbery, thieves handcuffed and blindfolded a guard and drove him around town, then let him out.	121

Unsuccessful Attempts

<u>Event</u>	<u>Crime Number</u>
o A prison break attempt failed when an acetylene torch, used on a steel partition, ran out of oxygen.	35
o A gang robbing a theater had a shootout with guards and fled without the loot.	50
o Airport burglars were infiltrated due to an informant guard.	53
o A tunnel into a bank vault was blocked by heavy dollies.	57
o Thieves broke into an empty airport vault.	70
o Robbers hijacked a truck, then abandoned it with the loot still inside.	73
o A robber put his gun in his pants to tie up a guard; the guard then jumped him.	76
o Burglar(s) was unable to replace Monet originals with copies as planned.	84
o A wire transfer fraud was infiltrated by the FBI.	103
o Planned robbery of a Brink's truck was discovered by police.	105
o An alert employee noticed a hole in the bank ceiling where equipment had been placed to record the vault combination.	114
o Detectives were informed of a jewelry robbery before it took place.	119
o An employee questioned a bank manager who asked for money (coerced manager).	120

IV. OBSERVATIONS PERTINENT TO POTENTIAL NUCLEAR CRIMES

Since the goal of the research is to point out threats to nuclear programs and facilities, the data were carefully analyzed with respect to what observations could be made that were thought to be pertinent to potential nuclear crimes. Observations that did not seem to yield analogous information were not included.

- o Crimes with exceptionally high "take" usually involve insiders. Insiders participated in 7 of the 10 top-value crimes.
- o There are key employee jobs that make it possible for a single insider to do extensive damage (e.g., one computer consultant stole \$10,250,000).
- o Apprehension rate for crimes involving insiders or insiders working with outsiders was a fairly high 15 of 26 (58%), while the apprehension rate for crimes using outsiders only was much lower, 9 of 32 (28%).
- o When crimes are committed by only insiders (either one or more), apprehension is extremely high (perhaps because insiders are usually amateur criminals). Of 6 such cases, 5 resulted in apprehensions and the sixth insider was known and the operation broken (though he has not yet been apprehended).
- o Deception was used in 25 of 73 offenses (34%) and was effective in 23 of 25 (92%).
- o Coercion of employees is effective too. Three-fourths of the coercion attempts succeeded; many of these involved holding family members as hostages.
- o Thirteen crimes of 77 (17%) resulted in failure. Reasons include such things as informers, surveillance, panic, and serendipity.
- o Thieves tended to be much more interested in loot of an intrinsic nature regardless of security measures. Cash and jewelry accounted for 92 of 118 crimes (78%). There is obviously a reluctance to steal loot that has to be converted to cash. (This is probably due both to costs of fencing and having to expand the number of individuals with knowledge of the crime.) An example of this is art: Art treasures provide considerable extrinsic value and museums have minimal security, but art theft represented only 13% of the crimes.

- o The two most popular targets are banks and vehicles. They provide considerable loot, usually of intrinsic value, and their security ranges from light to heavy.
- o Of crimes involving guarded trucks, 16 of 22 (73%) took place while guards were outside of their trucks (restaurant stops, loading, unloading, etc.).
- o Although the crimes are economic in nature, many motivations can be observed (politics, disgruntled employees, coerced employees, etc.).
- o As the value of the loot increases, the number of perpetrators tends to increase.

V. LESSONS FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY: INFERENCES DRAWN FROM THE ANALYSIS

When comparing analogies, identical components (see Fig. 1) can often be discerned, enabling one to draw useful inferences. Because conclusions are based on such inferences and not on rigorous scientific scrutiny, they should be viewed only as inferences and not as "laws." However, this fact should not detract from what those in the nuclear community might learn from analogies and use to their advantage.

The crimes chosen for this study are felt to be as similar as possible to potential crimes against nuclear facilities and programs. The observations were arrived at through analysis of a fairly large number of such crimes, and, finally, the inferences made in this section were based on what was felt to be (1) clearly consistent data from the analogous crimes, and (2) their relevance to nuclear safeguards and security concerns.

Deception

As has been noted in the Observations section, deception is a highly effective method of perpetrating a crime. It is usually extreme in its simplicity--if a man wears a telephone repairman's uniform and drives a telephone company truck, then he must be a telephone repairman. If he is in line with 30 members of Congress and gives as his name the name of a congressman, he must be that congressman. This latter case is described in some detail in the following section. Although not an economic high-value crime, it is nonetheless an excellent example of the entree obtainable by deception.

Deception is somewhat akin to the insider threat. It is a means to being viewed as an insider and having the access of an insider, although for a much shorter period of time. It offers the further advantage of being more transient in nature and therefore lessens the chance of apprehension. In our data the apprehension rate was a fairly low 39%, much lower than the apprehension rate for crimes involving insiders. However, deception is one of the tools of the professional, whereas the insider is more often an amateur.

It must be noted, however, that insider crimes and deception crimes are not necessarily two separate categories. In several instances in our data, insiders participated in crimes of deception. These insiders were often people of insufficient authority and/or access to commit the crime without the aid of deception.

A reasonable inference would be that under some deceiving guise, people with inimical intent toward nuclear facilities and/or programs could well gain entrance to otherwise off-limit areas and represent a considerable threat as a result.

Diversion

Diversion is the crime of surreptitiously diverting some particular loot from an inside area, such as nuclear materials from a nuclear facility. It usually requires inside knowledge and/or access. In one of the crime examples described in the following section, certain Las Vegas casinos had \$7 million in coins diverted over an 18-month period. This crime took place under the most safeguarded conditions; Las Vegas has for years taken the most extreme precautions against any and all attempts to illegally tap its considerable

resources. Other diversions of large sums of money are also described in the combined data base. As mentioned above, the combination of inside knowledge and high-technology competence may create a vulnerability in the area of diverting an "inventory stock," whether that stock is money or nuclear materials.

Coercion

The data also pointed out the effectiveness of coercion as a means of inducing insider cooperation, especially when family members were innocently involved. When one's wife or children are under immediate threat of losing their lives, otherwise unquestioned motivations such as company loyalty, honesty, etc., may be negated. There is no reason to believe such coercion would not equally negate the validity of clearances as an index of the same motivations.

In our data in virtually every case, the coerced victim was an insider of authority and access--presidents, managers, and owners. Even if the company knew of the crime, it usually went along because these people were in a position to have their orders carried out.

The Insider

Even the non-coerced insider represents a considerable threat. A scenario involving insiders is much more easily imagined in the nuclear crime community than an act strictly by outsiders. We have seen in this study that a single insider in a key position and with high-technology training can use the position and training to successfully pull off a crime in excess of \$10 million. (Although he was later apprehended, the thief who committed this crime held the money in his possession for quite a period of time. In a nuclear-

material situation, such as extortion, the criminal, even if he is known to be the perpetrator, can be "home free" simply by having the material, and later apprehension may not be feasible.) A further consideration of the insider problem is the fact that it may in one sense subtly recruit criminals--they may simply observe at some time that they are in a position to "make a bundle" and may, therefore, become what we have described as an opportunistic criminal as opposed to a professional one.

The insider is an additional threat inasmuch as he may be disgruntled, seeking revenge for some real or imagined wrong committed by the corporation, in financial trouble, or a crusader who feels, for example, he can prove that safety regulations are lax by showing how materials may be stolen or sabotage initiated. These situations indicate clearly that the number of potential criminals within the nuclear arena is much larger than perhaps envisaged under present clearance regulations.

Preference Based on Intrinsic Value or Ease of Conversion

Professional criminals seem to shy away from loot that requires considerable effort after theft to convert to a usable and untraceable commodity. Cash in amounts of \$5, \$10, \$20, \$50, and \$100 bills is the ideal loot and is, in turn, the most popular target. In the Observations section, jewelry was mentioned with cash as being of more intrinsic value than, say, art treasures. Most professional criminals have little trouble fencing jewelry, and while that does dilute the "take," the conversion is accomplished easily and at little risk. Also, there are times when such loot as diamonds, because of size

and/or weight, is preferable, e.g., when smuggling \$10 million in or out of a country.

Nuclear materials would not seem to be a popular target in economically motivated crimes (a noteworthy exception might prove to be the commissioned job). To our knowledge fences have not been established. It should be pointed out that this particular inference is more relevant to professional criminals than, say, foreign agents. There is little indication from the crimes examined for this study that the typical professional criminal would view nuclear materials as a desirable target.

Economic Motivation

To possess nuclear materials illegally would be to possess a potential for great wealth, through extortion, ransom, or sale to a competitive market. Although as noted above the typical professional criminal is not likely to be interested in nuclear materials for an economically motivated crime, certain criminal minds may yet be drawn to the biggest of the "big scores." The crimes examined in this study make it clear that if criminals feel there is some great financial reward to be had, some will take the chance, even at the risk of imprisonment, death or injury, or (as in the case of nuclear materials) disease.

If nuclear material was indeed the target of an economically motivated crime, many of the elements involved in non-nuclear high-value crimes would seem to pertain. From our combined data bases, 7 of the 10 highest-value crimes involved insiders. There was also a distinct trend toward the utilization of more criminals in the

higher-yield crimes, mainly because of the need for a task force operation. High-value crimes often meant hiring technological specialists (e.g., electronics experts to circumvent alarm systems), and perhaps explosive experts, safe crackers, drivers, a "brain," and in some instances laborers to dig tunnels, carry heavy bags of loot, etc.

Political Motivation

Our data base shows that financial need was the motivation for two crimes by politically motivated groups. Political organizations, such as terrorist groups, may need financing for their operations, as well as a commodity to use for pressure bargaining (e.g., hostages). The motivation might be even greater if a commodity were stolen that could offer, not only money to finance further operations, but a chance to obtain some political goal through the type of demands only nuclear capabilities could allow them to make. They, along with agents and insiders, represent a population most likely to commit crimes against nuclear facilities and programs.

Transportation

The authors recognize that nuclear security and safeguards personnel have placed a great deal of emphasis on protecting materials being transported. In spite of this, the large number of attacks against (non-nuclear) armored trucks in our data would indicate the possibility that, if a concerted effort was made to obtain nuclear materials, such an effort might be directed at goods in transit. The scope of this Note does not cover commenting on the probability of success of any threats--merely pointing out where one might be

targeted. Professional criminals are often extremely determined and do not allow themselves to be easily dissuaded from a theft because of security precautions such as alarm systems, armed guards, armored trucks. Of course, there is a level of security that obviously does deter them, for example Fort Knox.

VI. CRIME EXAMPLES APPLICABLE TO POTENTIAL NUCLEAR TARGETS

Examination of the new 1976-1979 data on crimes yields seven categories of crimes and criminals that seem particularly analogous to potential adversaries or potential activities against nuclear programs or facilities. Seven crimes were chosen as examples of these categories, and detailed accounts of these seven are presented below. The seven categories are:

- o Hostile employees
- o A coerced employee
- o An economically motivated insider
- o A crime of diversion
- o Non-economic high-level penetration through deception
- o A politically based crime for economic gain
- o A high-technology insider crime

Hostile Employees

At about 2:30 pm on a Monday in June 1979, a father and son, both Wells Fargo guards, robbed the armored car they were guarding of \$374,000 while it was en route from Ohio to Kentucky. Using their guns, they overcame the driver, then bound and gagged and left him, driving the truck away and later abandoning it. \$226,709 of the loot was in cash, \$138,179 in non-negotiable checks, and about \$9700 in food stamps. The robbers left a note in the truck expressing their distress at receiving only \$4/hr in wages from Wells Fargo.

The next day, Tuesday, police surrounded the home of a friend of theirs in Rochester, New York, where they were staying. After a 3-1/2

hour standoff the son tried to escape and was captured, and the father surrendered peacefully. All the loot was found in the house, along with six pistols, a sawed-off shotgun, knives and about 300 rounds of ammunition.

The father had worked for Wells Fargo for three years and had recently been promoted to captain. It was in this position that he processed an employment application for his son.

A Coerced Employee

On the night of Tuesday, October 30, 1979, a masked gunman broke into the home of the Bank of Commerce president in Arlington, Texas, and held him, his wife and two children hostage overnight. The next morning at 7:00 am a business associate who had come to pick up the president was also taken hostage. The gunman then ordered the president to go to the bank, take \$250,000 from the vault, and return alone within 35 minutes or he would shoot the wife. The president did so. Upon his return the president was locked in the trunk of his own car. He freed himself about 10:00 am and called police, who set up roadblocks but did not catch the thief.

An Economically Motivated Insider

At 3:00 am on Monday, December 11, 1978, \$5.8 million in cash and jewelry was stolen from the Lufthansa cargo terminal at the Kennedy International Airport. At that time it was the largest holdup in the nation's history.

A group of about seven men wearing ski masks and driving a stolen black 1977 Ford van drove up to the security fence surrounding the terminal. They cut through a lock on the fence and did not set off

any alarm (reports conflict as to whether the fence or lock had an alarm). They then drove to the terminal and encountered a Lufthansa employee whom they pistol-whipped and forced into their van. They then drove directly to the high-value vault inside the terminal. There they handcuffed about nine employees and at gunpoint forced the night manager to open the vault. Various reports have it that they also forced someone to disconnect the alarm or that the manager's keys automatically bypassed the alarm. At any rate no alarm sounded. They loaded the van and drove off. Soon after, an incoming employee saw what had happened and called the police.

The money, which was insured, had been sent by Commerzbank of West Germany via Lufthansa to the Chase Manhattan Bank. It consisted of \$5 million in used bills of small denominations that had been exchanged abroad by Americans. It was therefore considered untraceable. Although these banks usually transfer funds by credit or debit on paper, such a cash transaction is not considered out of the ordinary. The thieves also took \$850,000 in jewelry from the vault.

Because the thieves knew where the high-value vault was located, and because it was presumed they knew that the vault held an unusual amount of money, authorities correctly theorized that this was an inside job. A 10-year employee of Lufthansa, who had been suspected of committing a \$22,000 theft from them in 1976, had gambling debts. Police believe he suggested the theft to his bookmaker who sent him to a second bookmaker in Nassau County. Police think this man recruited the group who committed the robbery.

Police uncovered the names of the suspects mainly through informants. Three of the participants were on probation at the time,

and two resided together at a halfway house. The group frequented a bar near the airport called Robert's Lounge where known cargo thieves hung out. In addition, the Lufthansa employee is alleged to have been informant to them, and to have paid another Lufthansa employee \$10,000 (out of his own \$80,000 take) not to implicate him. The two employees are said to have talked about committing such a robbery, but then one did so without the second. The second employee told the police and was subsequently put in the Federal witness-protection program. Authorities originally became suspicious of him when they discovered that he was preparing to leave for South America.

Of those presumed to have taken part in the crime, two were arrested: one of the parolees, and the above-mentioned employee who was arrested on February 20, 1979. The two men were charged with violation of the Hobbs Act--forceful theft from a company doing business in interstate commerce; theft from an interstate shipment; possession of goods taken from an interstate or foreign shipment--and conspiracy. The state police case against the parolee was dismissed due to legal problems related to a search warrant. However, he and another participant had their paroles revoked for associating with known criminals, and as of January 3, 1980, were back in jail. Also as of January 3, the employee is the only one to have been charged, and he was also charged with the 1976 Lufthansa theft. Besides instigating the idea for the crime, his main role had been to disappear when security men came to the terminal a few days before the theft to pick up the cash. His signature was needed, and when he couldn't be located the security men had to leave the cash behind. He was tried and sentenced on May 16, 1979, to 16-1/2 years imprisonment.

Although offered immunity, he refused to talk, apparently out of fear.

His fear was well-founded. Since the Lufthansa robbery, two people involved in it have disappeared and five have been murdered. The man believed to have stolen the Ford van used in the robbery was murdered a week after the theft. The frozen body of the person suspected of laundering the stolen money was found in February 1979. One of the suspected thieves was found shot to death in May 1979, another in June 1979. Finally, the body of a woman linked to a participant was found dismembered in May 1979.

Although all of the criminals involved in the robbery were considered to be relatively small time, two of them were friends of a prominent member of an organized crime family. An hypothesis has it that the robbers had to pay the family for the privilege of committing the robbery, and it is likely that the money and jewels were filtered into "legitimate" businesses associated with the mob. Most of the loot was never recovered.

This was no sophisticated caper; it was an old-fashioned stick-'em-up. It is interesting that this type of crime can net so much. It is also interesting that the actual participants probably did not receive much recompense; most of it seemingly went to the mob.

A Crime of Diversion

A counting-room rake-off operation took place in Las Vegas over an 18-month period in 1974, 1975, and 1976, partly in public view and under the eye of state watchdogs whose job it is to see that Nevada collects all due taxes. The scheme was simple and brazen, and it obviously involved a number of people--too many, it turned out, since

spreading knowledge of its existence was its downfall. It was the first such operation ever broken by a law enforcement agency, but not before it netted \$7 million. Our most recent information indicates that no one has been charged.

The owner of the Stardust Hotel-Casino had been under investigation since 1974 (before he actually bought the Stardust) when he took out loans worth \$100 million from the Teamsters' Central States Pension Fund. Directly afterward he bought the Argent Corporation, a parent firm that owned the Stardust Hotel-Casino and three lesser casinos, the Marina, the Hacienda, and the Fremont.

Upon purchase, the new owner took the unusual step of centralizing slot machine supervision, and the coins from all four casinos were brought to the Stardust to be counted. In November 1974, the coin scale at the Stardust was rewired to underweigh the coins by one-third. Also, meters on slot machines were set to indicate they were paying out more to customers than actually was the case.

The coins skimmed off the top were rolled and wrapped, and an ingenious method was implemented for exchanging this 175 tons of metal for paper money. The coins were boldly stored in a public area that appeared to be part of a change cage; they were simply sold to change girls for currency in bills.

In late 1975 a member of the Stardust's outside auditing firm discovered the operation, but it is not clear whether management was informed. At any rate, the cheating continued. The activity became known and law enforcement officers eventually received much "street information" on it. The Gaming Control Board raided the Stardust on May 18, 1976; the scandal was disclosed publicly in June.

The man hired by Argent as slot machine manager in October 1974, a month before the operation began, disappeared the day of the raid. However, it is not clear who, or what group, perpetrated the operation or who knew about it.

Non-economic High-level Penetration Through Deception

Although this is not considered a major crime (at this time it is not clear that any crime was committed), it is nonetheless an excellent example of penetration of security at a high level.

A reporter posed as a congressman, broke security, and gained access to the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty on the White House lawn on Monday, March 26, 1979. A House member had earlier told the reporter that, though all senators and congressmen were invited, he was not going to attend the signing, and that no credentials had been issued for congressmen to be allowed to board special buses for the trip from the Capitol to the White House. When the day came and the House and Senate members converged on the buses, security officers had no time to perform ID inspections. The reporter simply gave an officer the name of the congressman he knew would not be there, the officer checked the name off a congressional roster, and the reporter boarded the bus. He was never questioned again.

As the reporter put it, "All it took was one call, one question, a little observation and one lie to get a police-escorted ride to a first-class seat on the Executive Mansion's lawn--50 feet from the table where Mideast peace documents were signed."

It was reported that on that same night four George Washington University law students cracked security again by posing as waiters

and working the formal dinner inside the White House honoring the Egyptian and Israeli heads of state.

A Politically Based Crime for Economic Gain

In Oviedo, Spain, on a Sunday in July 1979, a dozen robbers armed with pistols stormed the home of a bank manager, holding him and his wife and daughter hostage overnight. Then, with the manager, they drove in three cars to the manager's bank. They forced him to let them in, ordered the few bank employees to lie on the floor, and cleaned out the vault. Then an armored car, perhaps serendipitously, arrived carrying a \$1.38 million payroll for a government coal mine. The robbers fired their pistols into the air and forced the guards to hand over the cash. They made off with a total of \$1.96 million. An alarm had been sounded during the robbery, but the thieves slipped through roadblocks and checkpoints that had been quickly set up.

Two abandoned cars used in the holdup were found to have been stolen by ETA (Basque Land and Liberty) urban guerrillas over the weekend, and the robbers had Basque accents. This was the biggest bank robbery in the history of Spain.

A High-technology Insider Crime

A computer-programming consultant who worked at a Security Pacific National Bank branch in Southern California allegedly swindled the bank of \$10.25 million. The consultant may fit, as a Stanford expert on computer crime claims, the psychological profile of the typical problem-solving computer-oriented criminal. Actually, computers played only a small (albeit key) part in this daring and elaborately planned theft. The crime failed simply because the

consultant told too many people what he had done. In fact, Security Pacific had not realized that the money had been stolen--the FBI informed them after being alerted by the consultant's attorney.

Exactly how long the consultant had been planning this crime is unknown, but it was clearly premeditated. In June 1978 the man engaged a Los Angeles diamond broker to negotiate a sale with the Russian firm of Russalmaz, the Soviet Government's official diamond broker in Zurich. He told them he planned to buy \$10 million worth of diamonds up to three carats in size and of commercial quality or better.

On Wednesday, October 25, he entered the bank. He was a familiar face; he was an insider. He went past a guard and into the wire-transfer room where the Federal Reserve Communication's System, or Fed wire, was used to transfer funds by cable between branches and to other banks. He had worked in the wire-transfer room and knew its layout and how wire transfers were effected. He simply looked up the day's "key," the secret code number which must be included in any transfer order. Late that afternoon he telephoned the transfer room. He identified himself as an officer of the bank's international division, and gave at least three codes--the "key," an officer's ID, and a secret account number. It is not clear whether he learned these two other codes in the wire-transfer room, through access to the bank's computer, or in some other way. (Later a Security Pacific officer said that the bank had recently changed its key system, and the consultant might have worked on the changeover.) Then, having satisfied all security requirements, he transferred \$10.25 million to his own account at the Irving Trust Company in New York. That money

or part of it was then automatically transferred to Russalmaz's account at the Wozchod Bank in Zurich.

On October 27 he flew to Geneva and picked up the polished diamonds that he had bought from Russalmaz with \$8.1 million of the stolen money. Russalmaz held the rest of the money in cash. On October 29 he allegedly smuggled the diamonds into the U.S., telling Customs he had nothing to declare. He then made his first mistake. Using his own name, he sold about 12 of the diamonds to a Beverly Hills jeweler. The jeweler routinely reported the purchase to the Beverly Hills police; they noted that the stones were loose and unmounted and began an investigation. On October 31 the consultant made a second vital mistake. While visiting an attorney he referred to the role he had played in the theft. It is not clear what his motivation was, but the situation did not involve a confidential lawyer/client relationship. After the visit ended, the attorney called the FBI. To further complicate matters, on November 1 the consultant's mother reported him missing to the San Diego police.

Also on November 1, the consultant flew to New York and began negotiations with a man there whom he had worked with before. He allegedly told the New Yorker, not that he had millions in diamonds, but that he had gotten involved in land development in Europe, that his clients paid him in cash and diamonds, and that he had a cash-flow problem with the diamonds. He said that he would be living in Europe for the foreseeable future and needed someone in the U.S. to establish a brokerage firm through which he could sell the diamonds. Six thousand dollars was put up as good faith money. The New Yorker knew that the consultant had lived in Europe and spoke German, so he

believed the story and agreed to see what he could do. But it was too late. On November 3 the FBI and Security Pacific held a press conference, accused the consultant of the theft, and released his picture. The New York contact, realizing he had been duped, called the FBI.

On November 5 the consultant made his final, fatal mistake. He called New York and asked that the good faith money be sent to a post office box in Carlsbad, California. The FBI traced the box to an old friend of the consultant's. On November 6, 12 days after the crime, he was arrested at his friend's apartment. Diamonds were allegedly found in his luggage.

He was originally indicted on one count, transporting stolen property across state lines. Three more counts were later added: entering a bank to commit a felony, fraud by wire, and smuggling goods into the United States. One noteworthy aspect about this crime was that no one knew it had occurred until six days afterward. Security Pacific was informed of the crime by the FBI eight days afterward. They hadn't noticed that the money was missing because the theft was sophisticated and because their own backup checking system failed.

The FBI and Security Pacific maintain that all the money was accounted for in diamonds and in \$2,055,000 held by Russalmaz in Zurich, which was being returned to Security Pacific. The consultant made it obvious that an insider can penetrate the Fed wire system and do a great deal of damage. He also uncovered loopholes with lucrative payoffs in a monetary system that no longer deals with money. In its own defense, the Security Pacific Bank Vice Chairman said, "He had done some work for the bank and he placed his call just after the

close of business, and it caught our personnel at a low level of security alertness." However, it should be noted that he also said the bank completely overhauled their Fed wire security system after the theft.

VII. SYNOPSES OF OLD AND NEW DATA BASES

For purposes of brevity, the following synopses of all the crimes in the data bases include only data relevant to the present analysis. As noted in Section I, the old data base was written for an early study of analogies to potential nuclear crimes. The new data base, written for this Note, is more detailed.

Old Data Base

(1)

January 17, 1950

Seven persons participated in an armed robbery of Brink's, Inc., armored car service headquarters in Boston. A total of 11 persons were involved in the crime. The haul amounted to \$1 million in small bills and \$500,000 in checks, some of them negotiable.

(2)

December 9, 1954

Four masked bandits robbed the Bank of America branch on Geary near Arguello Boulevard in San Francisco of \$16,599, using a walkie-talkie in contact with a lookout.

(3)

October 22-23, 1955

Two weeks after the crime two men were arrested in Phoenix, Arizona, and charged with having burglarized the safe of the Bank of New Mexico branch located on the Sandia Special Weapons Atomic Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The loot amounted to \$46,500 in bills of varying amounts, and some silver, mostly in rolls.

(4)

August 6, 1956

A gang burglarized the night depository of the Meadowbrook National Bank on Long Island, New York, and made off with \$100,000.

(5)

January 27, 1958

An undetermined number of "experts" burglarized the vault of the Caisse Nationale d'Economie, a Montreal trust company. The loot was \$1,800,000 in negotiable bonds.

(6)

May 3, 1958

An undetermined number of "professionals" burglarized the vault of the Brockville Trust and Savings in Canada. Over \$2 million in bearer securities and non-negotiable bonds were taken.

(7)

June 19, 1960

A lone burglar smashed a vault in the State Motor Vehicles Department in Charleston, West Virginia, removing \$300,000 in cash and \$500,000 in checks.

(8)

December 28, 1960

Authorities agreed that not less than two men and possibly four were involved in the burglary of the vault of the Rasdale Armored Car Service in Tampa, Florida. Nineteen money bags containing \$421,000 in currency and checks were stolen.

(9)

July 11, 1962

Several burglars stole 35 paintings worth \$980,000 from the O'Hana Art Gallery in the Mayfair section of London in what was described as a "fantastic" operation.

(10)

August 14, 1962

A gang consisting of nine men and one woman hijacked a U.S. mail truck near Plymouth, Massachusetts. The haul was \$1,551,277 in cash--mostly in small worn bills--being shipped by registered mail in a small mail van guarded by two men.

(11)

August 8, 1963

A gang of 20-30 robbers held up a Glasgow-to-London mail train near London. The loot amounted to more than \$7 million.

(12)

November 8, 1963

At least four and probably five armed robbers hijacked a station wagon of the AAA Jewelers' Messengers in New York, in which six unarmed employees were traveling. The robbers drove off the messenger service vehicle which contained at least \$1,000,000 in jewels and gold, most of which they later abandoned with the vehicle.

(13)

January 29, 1964

Six or seven masked men tied and gagged nine employees of a Montreal government armory and escaped with machine guns, bazookas, bombs, and large quantities of ammunition.

(14)

January 4, 1965

A truck and trailer containing 14 tons of government-owned mercury worth \$126,000 was stolen from a warehouse yard of Consolidated Freightways in Chicago.

(15)

May 15-16, 1965

A burglary involving 23 tons of mercury valued at \$335,000 took place over a weekend at a warehouse in Newark, New Jersey.

(16)

October 25, 1965

Police said that at least four men, possibly more, burglarized the Brink's office vault in Syracuse, New York, over a weekend. A 20-mm cannon was used to blast a hole in the side of the vault. The burglars took \$100,000 in cash and about \$250,000 in checks.

(17)

December 30, 1966

In what police described as a "very professional, very clean and very tidy" burglary, several men and possibly a woman stole eight paintings, valued at from \$5 to \$7 million, from Dulwich College Art Gallery in London.

(18)
May 2, 1967

A gang said to number from six to ten hijacked a bank truck belonging to N. M. Rothschild & Sons and later transferred to another vehicle 144 bars of gold bullion weighing 1.9 tons and valued at \$2,000,000. The hijacking took place in the Islington district in northeast London.

(19)
March 25, 1968

A number of burglars, using elaborate tools and a walkie-talkie, cut open a basement vault of the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company in the Queens borough of New York City and escaped with thousands of dollars. Police termed the burglary expert and professional.

(20)
February 13, 1970

Two armed robbers and possibly a third in a getaway car took \$40,000 from the Union Savings and Loan Bank in Danbury, Connecticut. Diversionary bombs were set off by them in a police station, the bank, and a parking lot.

(21)
December 4, 1970

Three men created a traffic jam in the tunnel under Hyde Park Corner in London and hijacked an airline truck carrying gold bullion worth \$250,000.

(22)
1970-1971

A million dollars' worth of freight cars was stolen from Penn Central allegedly by a small railroad, located in Illinois, possibly by means of computer manipulations and switching operations.

(23)
January 1971

Two people accidentally penetrated an area where considerable measures had been taken to avoid access by nonemployees.

(24)

April 28, 1971

Four men were charged with burglarizing a branch of the Chase Manhattan Bank in the Bay Ridge section of New York City of \$200,000 in cash and jewelry from safe deposit boxes.

(25)

September 7, 1971

Perpetrators estimated at from six to eight in number hijacked a truck belonging to the Railroad Express Agency. The hijacking took place near Clifton, New Jersey. The cargo was \$171,000 in gold and silver in liquid form.

(26)

December 13, 1971

Eight men were arrested in connection with the burglary of \$115,000 in cash from the vault of the Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company branch in Queens, New York.

(27)

March 25-26, 1972

A burglary gang, consisting of five family-related members and possibly one or two others, blasted their way into a United California Bank branch in Laguna Niguel, California, and made off with between \$2-5 million worth of negotiable securities and jewelry from 450 safe deposit boxes. \$50,000 was stolen from the bank itself.

(28)

May 4, 1972

A bank vault in Lordstown, Ohio, was looted of \$430,000 in cash by three to four "professional" burglars.

(29)

September 1972

Three hooded armed robbers stole 18 paintings and 39 art objects valued at \$2 million from the Montreal Museum of Fine Arts.

(30)
October 20, 1972

Two or possibly three burglars evaded sophisticated security devices at the Caramoor Center of Music and the Arts in Katonah, New York, and stole twelve art works whose total worth was estimated at over \$500,000.

(31)
March 25, 1973

Police estimate that two to five professional safecrackers burglarized the vault of the Baumstein and Feder jewelry firm in Manhattan, New York. The loot was a collection of diamonds and rings valued at \$100,000 plus.

(32)
May 9, 1973

An undetermined number of burglars pushed a two-ton safe through the wall of a loft in a diamond merchant's firm in New York City to the street below. The safe contained diamonds valued at more than \$200,000.

(33)
September 1973

A cat burglar, possibly with one or more accomplices, climbed 25 feet of drainpipe to gain entry to a private apartment in New York City, which he burglarized of 30 works of art valued at \$150,000.

(34)
January 4, 1974

Four armed men in hard hats, posing as telephone workers, gained entrance to a cargo building at Kennedy Airport and escaped with more than \$200,000 in cash.

(35)
April 18, 1974

Two men and two women, armed with weapons, attempted to free three prisoners in the Manhattan House of Detention for Men in Manhattan. Their attempt failed and they left the prison without difficulty through the visitors' exit. They were within three inches of completing an opening 12 by 15 inches in a steel partition separating the visitors from several prisoners when their acetylene torch ran out of oxygen.

(36)
April 22, 1974

Three burglars who tunneled 136 feet under the main street of Marietta, Georgia, and blasted a hole in the safety deposit room of the Cobb Exchange Bank over a weekend got away with less than \$1,000.

(37)
April 28, 1974

Police speculated that probably three "very good burglars" were involved in the theft of diamonds, gold, cash, and other valuables from the Paramount Jewelers Exchange in New York City. The haul was estimated to have a value of from one to three million dollars.

(38)
July 5, 1974

In August of 1975 FBI agents arrested four men in connection with the burglary of the weapons vault at the National Guard armory, Compton, California. The haul was described as enough weapons and ammunition to outfit a full Army company.

(39)
October 20, 1974

Six or possibly seven men were eventually charged with the theft from a vault of the Armored Express Company in Chicago of \$4.3 million in cash. There was no forcible entry of the vault, probably because of the help of an inside man.

(40)
January 9, 1975

A plot was revealed to steal six tons of Army weapons for sale to the IRA by an Army lieutenant who planned to blast into the arms cache at Fort Meyer, Virginia.

(41)
February 10, 1975

A group of "professional criminals" burglarized the safe of the Department of Finance office in lower Manhattan and carried

off \$127,000 in nickels, dimes, and quarters which had been collected from parking meters.

(42)
February 17, 1975

An undetermined number of burglars stole 28 paintings worth approximately \$5 million from the Milan Gallery of Modern Art in Milan, Italy.

(43)
April 14, 1975

Two armed men and a third man who drove the getaway car robbed the Boston Museum of Fine Arts of a Rembrandt painting valued at up to one million dollars.

(44)
October 10, 1975

Five "extremely dangerous" prisoners used an electronic device similar to a remote control arrangement to open security grills of the U.S. maximum security penitentiary at Marion, Illinois. As of October 18, 1975, four of the five escapees had been apprehended.

(45)
November 2, 1975

While one man stood watch, two burglars scaled the buttresses of Cologne Cathedral in West Germany, swung down a Gothic wall with mountain-climbing spikes and a rope ladder into the religious treasury and made off with millions of dollars of precious stones, gold, and silver.

New Data Base

It should be pointed out that almost all of the synopses below are based on newspaper and journal articles. For some crimes only one article was available with no follow-up; for other more "popular" crimes, many articles were available and allowed for more comprehensive summaries.

(46)

1974-1979

As of February 28, 1979, Israeli police were holding 23 suspects in an investigation of thefts of diamonds valued at about \$250 million, and more arrests were expected. Thefts from warehouses at Ben-Gurion International Airport had been going on for five years. According to sources, most of those arrested were porters at the airport, but five members of the local diamond exchange were also being held.

(47)

1974-1976

A counting-room rake-off operation took place in Las Vegas over an 18-month period in 1974, 1975, and 1976, partly in public view and under the eye of state watchdogs whose job it is to see that Nevada collects all due taxes. The scheme was simple and brazen, and it obviously involved a number of people--too many, it turned out, since spreading knowledge of its existence was its downfall. It was the first such operation ever broken by a law enforcement agency, but not before it netted \$7 million. Our most recent information indicates that no one has been charged.

The owner of the Stardust Hotel-Casino had been under investigation since 1974 (before he actually bought the Stardust) when he took out loans worth \$100 million from the Teamsters' Central States Pension Fund. Directly afterward he bought the Argent Corporation, a parent firm that owned the Stardust Hotel-Casino and three lesser casinos, the Marina, the Hacienda, and the Fremont.

Upon purchase, the new owner took the unusual step of centralizing slot machine supervision, and the coins from all four casinos were brought to the Stardust to be counted. In November 1974, the coin scale at the Stardust was rewired to underweigh the coins by one-third. Also, meters on slot machines were set to indicate they were paying out more to customers than actually was the case.

The coins skimmed off the top were rolled and wrapped, and an ingenious method was implemented for exchanging this 175 tons of metal for paper money. The coins were boldly stored in a public area that appeared to be part of a change cage; they were simply sold to change girls for currency in bills.

In late 1975 a member of the Stardust's outside auditing firm discovered the operation, but it is not clear whether management was informed. At any rate, the cheating continued. The activity became known and law enforcement officers eventually received much "street information" on it. The Gaming Control Board raided the Stardust on May 18, 1976; the scandal was disclosed publicly in June.

A man who was hired by Argent as slot machine manager in October 1974, a month before the operation began, disappeared the day of the raid. However, it is not clear who, or what group, perpetrated the operation or who knew about it.

(48)

March 30, 1976

On Tuesday, March 30, 1976, at 2:40 pm a Brink's truck was hijacked from a Royal Bank of Canada branch in Montreal. The truck had been making pickups that day and held almost \$2.8 million in Canadian currency and Olympic coins. Three of the four Brink's guards had in fact just loaded one consignment from the Royal Bank into the rear of the truck and gone back into the bank to pick up another, leaving one guard (the driver) in the truck.

It was at this time that two vans drove into the alley where the truck was parked and blocked it both front and rear (the rear van may have driven in earlier). The back doors of the front van were opened revealing two men manning an antiaircraft machine gun pointed back toward the Brink's driver. The driver surrendered and was disarmed by a gunman and forced under the dashboard of the Brink's truck. Then the truck and the front (machine gun) van, which was stolen and had stolen plates, were driven to a tennis club on Nun's Island, about 10 minutes away. The second van, which had been rented under an assumed name, was abandoned at the bank.

At Nun's Island the gunmen opened the first lock of the truck's rear doors with an inside lever, then opened the second lock with a key. They transferred the money bags (61 bags of cash and 29 of coins) to a third van, and drove off in it, leaving the machine-gun van, the truck, and the guard, who was poorly handcuffed and gagged. He escaped quickly and called police. By this time the three guards at the bank had realized something was amiss and had called Brink's.

The entire job took less than half an hour. It was speculated at the time that professionals had planned the job in great detail and that an insider may have helped. It appeared that three men carried it out. One robber wore a ski mask, the others probably wore makeup, and all probably wore gloves. "The Blue Knight," a TV series, had used such a machine-gun plot in one of its shows not long before the robbery.

In June 1976 a 60-year-old woman, her two sons and two daughters were arrested in Montreal homes. They were released due to lack of evidence. However, a third son and two others (brothers) remained in custody and more were being sought. The brothers were arrested at a summer cottage 130 miles north of Montreal. \$80,000 and some weapons were recovered. Police considered the theft solved.

(49)
April 6, 1976

At around 9:00 am on about Tuesday, April 6, 1976, three men wearing ski masks and gloves and carrying handguns stole \$851,000 in \$100s, \$50s, \$20s, \$10s, \$5s, and \$1s from two Wells Fargo guards. The guards were making a "normal" payroll delivery to a Citibank branch in the Daily News Building, New York City.

The two guards with their pistols drawn were pushing a dolly with 20 bags of money on it through a brightly lighted basement hallway. They had just passed a stairwell door when it burst open and the robbers appeared. The guards scuffled briefly with the holdup men but were disarmed. Then they and two employees who were also in the hallway were handcuffed to the stairwell banister. The robbers each grabbed a large bag of paper currency (smaller bags of coins were left behind) and fled, apparently in two private garbage trucks which were seen leaving the scene of the crime. The entire incident took about five minutes.

One of the guards managed to remove his belt and make tapping noises with it on the stairwell door. A Daily News guard set off an alarm in the cashier's office.

Policemen believed the robbery was an inside job. "Someone knew the layout of the building and the time of the shipment." Our latest available information indicates that no one has been apprehended.

(50)
April 12, 1976

At about 6:30 am on Monday, April 12, 1976, three or four robbers wearing ski masks, armed with a sawed-off shotgun and two pistols, and carrying a bag of clothesline, entered a Times

Square theater by overpowering a cleaning worker. Then they seized 19 employees and visitors as they arrived, took them to the basement lounge, and tied their hands in front of them with the clothesline. One of the employees was a security guard who was disarmed.

The robbers went to the manager's office where the safe was but were told only Purolator guards had the combination. A Purolator armored truck was due that morning on a regular visit to pick up theater receipts, and the robbers told a number of captives that they were waiting for the guards.

At about 8:15 am the truck arrived with three guards. One guard stayed with the truck while the other two entered the building. Because the captives were all in the basement, no one saw the shootout that followed. The two guards were killed and the robbers fled with no loot. One guard had tried to shoot back. Upon hearing the shots, one of the captives managed to use a public phone to call police.

(51)
July 16-19, 1976

During the weekend of July 16-19, 1976, a gang of men tunneled into a bank vault in Nice, France, broke open deposit boxes, and made off with \$7.1 million in cash, gold ingots, jewels, and vault funds. This now-famous burglary has been called the crime of the century.

The gang leader, known as the "Brain," was a man with well-known right-wing political leanings. He began to plan the Nice burglary 18 months before it was committed. He held a safety deposit box at the bank, enabling him to access and photograph its vault. Public blueprints of Nice's sewage system were obtained to plan a 30-foot tunnel from a sewer to the vault. The Brain enlisted Marseilles mobsters, who paid for the two tons of equipment: jackhammers, hydraulic jacks, acetylene tanks, and more. Then a team of 20 men, half mobsters and half the Brain's political friends, spent two months digging. They knew the police rounds of that area, and so never aroused suspicion.

When they reached the vault wall, they waited until the weekend to make their move. But when the six who committed the actual burglary finally broke into the vault, their way was blocked by a 5-ton armored armoire. With their heavy tools they were able to tilt the armoire forward and enter the vault around it. (Another burglary, this one in Southgate, California, was foiled exactly because the tunnelers' path into the vault was blocked by dollies too heavy for them to move.) For unknown reasons the alarm system never sounded. While they worked, the Brain painted on the walls, "Without arms, without violence, without hate." When they left they abandoned much of their equipment.

Due to hard work and some breaks, the French police in a short time had the names of five of the burglars. Later, two more were caught trying to sell numbered gold ingots. After a roundup on October 26, 1976, seven men were indicted for complicity. Soon after, the police were informed who the Brain was, and on October 28 he was arrested. He confessed and said that he and his political friends had donated their share of the loot to a right-wing political organization called La Catena (The Chain). No record of La Catena existed. On March 10, 1977, the Brain escaped. Police now suspect that he also masterminded two earlier burglaries.

Only 5% of the loot was recovered and over 10 members of the gang escaped arrest. The trial of six suspects ended on November 2, 1979: three were found innocent and three others were sent to prison for terms of from 5-8 years.

(52)

August 14-16, 1976

Over a bank holiday weekend in 1976 (August 14-16), exactly four weeks after the famous Nice bank tunneling "crime of the century," burglars dug a 10-foot tunnel from the Paris sewer system into the vault of a Societe Generale bank and escaped with cash, gold and jewelry from 100 to 200 safe deposit boxes. (The victim bank of the Nice burglary was also a Societe Generale branch.) The estimate of the worth of the loot, based on \$25,000 per box, was about \$5 million. The gang used a plastic pipe and an air pump to supply themselves with air, and they left behind empty winebottles, blowtorches, and other equipment.

Guards and sewermen reported hearing "dull thumps" from the bank basement over the weekend. But private investigators on contract to the bank went to the scene and, after circling the bank twice and questioning nearby residents, dismissed the noise as coming from the kitchen of a nearby restaurant. They decided not to open the vault or notify the police. Bank management said the alarm system functioned perfectly but that there had been a "human failing." Police said the gang apparently managed to drill past the bank's alarm system, which was connected to police headquarters.

The thieves, according to one report based on an alleged eyewitness, wore sewermen's uniforms and donned gas masks as they carried heavy equipment on foot through the sewer.

(53)

October 26, 1976

On the night of Tuesday, October 26, 1976, three male burglars were arrested as they entered the Swissair cargo building at John F. Kennedy International Airport. Actually, the burglary was foiled three months earlier when a private security officer informed his IBI Corp. superiors that he had been approached by one of the suspects and asked to participate in the burglary. IBI informed Swissair and the police. A police officer posed as a fellow guard and was also taken into the conspiracy.

One of the three burglars was an electronics expert who was to defeat the alarm. In the vault at the time of the attempt was \$2 to \$5 million in currency, gold, securities, jewelry and watches.

(54)

November 1976

Six to 10 burglars used duplicate keys and cutting torches to enter the safe deposit box area of a major Milan bank over a weekend in November 1976. They rifled about 400 boxes, stealing perhaps \$4.5 million worth of Italian and foreign currency, jewelry, and gold bars. They evidently worked all weekend, leaving behind food, cigarettes, and oxygen containers for the torches.

(55)

July 4 to August 30, 1977

Between July 4 (a holiday) and August 30, 1977, a cat burglar struck eight elegant houses in the wealthy Long Island resort area of Southampton. He stole \$500,000 in diamonds and pearls from second-story master bedrooms while the owners were out at well publicized parties. Striking on weekend nights, he ignored cash in plain view and worked fast, hitting up to three houses in one night. Some of the victims suspected inside help, but police did not confirm that.

Because many of the homes were used only during the summer and on holidays, most of the owners had not wired them for alarms.

(56)

July 28, 1977

On Thursday, July 28, 1977, four masked men armed with pistols hijacked an unmarked Bank of France truck/trailer in Paris. The truck carried \$3.54 million in newly minted 1-franc and 5-franc coins.

The coins were in a 17-ton container in transit from a mint in Pessac, France, to the central Bank of France in Paris. A train had brought it into the Bercy station in eastern Paris where the truck had driven onto a ramp and taken the container. The truck started to roll down the ramp when another truck in front of it stalled. The driver got out of the bank truck and was suddenly encircled by three gunmen who quickly forced him and his guard into a car. Within minutes after the robbery began, a fourth gunman had driven the truck away. The driver and guard were driven to the Pantin gate in northeastern Paris, where they were let out. They found a policeman and gave the alert about 30 minutes after the start of the robbery.

At the time, police speculated that the gunmen had inside information since the truck was unmarked and the container cargo was listed only as "miscellaneous metal pieces." Sources also said the routing was "unusual." Special security was not assigned in order to keep the shipment inconspicuous.

In November 1977, \$270,000 worth of the coins was recovered at a private home in Avon, France, about 35 miles south of Paris, and a man and a woman were arrested.

(57)

August 26, 1977

Late Friday night, August 26, 1977, and in the early morning hours following, a gang of men attempted to enter by tunnel a Security Pacific bank vault in Southgate, California. The elaborate plot was foiled by a coin dolly weighing approximately 400 lbs which blocked the tunnel's entrance to the vault. Bank routine called for several coin carts to be stored in the vault when it was closed, wedged in such a manner that none could be moved unless the vault door was opened. (This would be known to bank employees; thus inside help was not suspected.)

The would-be burglars did not deactivate or circumvent the alarm system, and it was not necessary since the vault was time locked and couldn't be opened over the weekend. During the night of the crime three or four "false alarms" sounded, each followed by a police search that revealed nothing. At about 6 am the apparently malfunctioning alarm was disconnected, and an armed security guard, employed by an outside agency, was posted. At the time no one asked him and, surprisingly, he did not volunteer that he heard noises in the vault. On the following Monday morning when the timed vault was opened a hole was discovered in the floor.

There were indications that the bottom 20 inches of the vault floor had been drilled more neatly than the top 4 inches, leading to speculation that a slip of the drill through the bank floor made it necessary to complete the job sooner than planned.

An empty building across the street was the site of the tunnel opening. The building had been leased on July 1 by a "Mr. Goldman," supposedly for a carpet sales business. Evidently the digging of the tunnel started from that date. Various witnesses saw a lot of what appeared to be building activity there, but since the store was supposedly being remodeled, this didn't seem suspicious. Police investigators estimate that at least five or six men were involved.

The tunnel was structurally impressive and extremely accurate. It had been dug 110 ft diagonally under the town's main streets, directly to the bank and underneath the sewer system. (In comparison, the famous Nice bank tunnel was only 30-ft long.)

The value of the contents of the safe deposit boxes was estimated at about \$10 million. Six weeks after the crime no arrests had been made, and the investigation continued.

(58)

August 1977

On a Thursday in August 1977, before dawn, a diamond factory in Cape Town, South Africa, was robbed of \$3.4 to \$4.6 million in small uncut diamonds. The 280,000 stones weighed 17.6 pounds and 40,000 carats.

A diamond dealer who was joint owner and security chief of the factory received an anonymous call that morning ordering him to the factory under the threat of death to his wife and children. He was stopped outside his house and disarmed by a hooded Caucasian. The gunman forced him to drive his own car to the factory where two other armed men appeared. He was then forced to open the safe and give up the diamonds. As the gunmen left they threw sulfuric acid in the dealer's face.

A similar diamond robbery took place in 1968 with the same dealer; acid was thrown in his face then also.

(59)

September 1977

Sometime in September 1977, two men posing as jewelry appraisers for the prestigious Philadelphia firm of the House of Milnor stole \$300,000 worth of fine jewels from an unidentified Palm Springs bank. The 140 separate multistoned pieces were from the estate of the late ex-wife of a famous comedian, and were up for bid.

The robbery was smoothly executed in this way: The two robbers called ahead to set up an appraisal appointment. They

sounded knowledgeable and the bank did not question their credentials or call Milnor to verify their identity. Representatives of 14 jewelry firms had appraised the jewels by this time. The men arrived at the bank as arranged and slowly studied the jewels. No guards were assigned to watch them. Their request for a second appointment to finish their appraisal probably added credibility to their act. On the second visit they stayed until lunchtime. At 12:30 one of them closed the door to the examination room, drew a gun, and handcuffed, gagged and bound the woman employee with them. Then they simply walked out with the jewels.

The men appeared to know jewelry and probably used the first visit to case the bank. The jewels were probably broken up in order to be resold.

(60)
September 1977

It is reported that in September 1977, \$2 million to \$11 million in rubles was stolen from a bank in Yerevan, the capital of Soviet Armenia, which is located 1200 miles south of Moscow. Due to the government-controlled press, no accounts have been published, but the crime is common knowledge and was tacitly admitted to by an official of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Yerevan. The thieves evidently bored their way through the bank roof into a special room which held payrolls. They supposedly circumvented an alarm system in the ceiling. The burglary, or perhaps robbery, seems to have involved some sophistication, coordinated teamwork and possibly inside help.

(61)
October 8-10, 1977

Over Columbus Day weekend in 1977 (October 8-10), exactly \$1 million disappeared from the First National Bank of Chicago, in what could have been a bookkeeping or computer error. The money was accounted for when the bank closed Friday night, but on the following Tuesday night after the three-day weekend the head teller was unable to balance his books. However, since no miscalculation was found, the bank and the police assumed that an embezzlement or burglary, definitely an inside job, had been committed.

They believe \$1 million in cash was stolen from a locked money cart that was stored in a steel cage inside the main vault two floors below ground level. The lock on the cart was not broken and all five keys to it were accounted for. The personal lockers of all employees with access to the cart were searched and nothing was found, and all employees who could have been involved in the crime agreed to take lie detector tests. Those tests were not completed at the time our data were published.

Bank work had continued through the weekend and cash deliveries were made Saturday and Monday by Brinks and Purolator. Fewer than 100 persons had access to the area over the weekend, the vault was continuously guarded, and a time lock activated during hours of no activity.

(62)
October 22, 1977

On Saturday, October 22, 1977, probably four or five persons burgled the Stibbert Museum of Florence, Italy, of \$2,840,000 worth of ancient paintings, weapons, jewels, and various small art objects. Only the most valuable items were taken. The thieves apparently hid overnight in the museum's garden, used as a playground during the day, then climbed to the roof and lowered themselves into the interior through a skylight. They forced open a garden door when leaving.

(63)
December 1977

On a Monday in December 1977, burglars used cutting torches to open two vaults and four wall safes in a Chicago jewelry store, and made off with an estimated \$1 million in jewelry and \$30,000 in cash. They also tried unsuccessfully to cut open the store's main vault. Police described the thieves as "highly skilled technicians" who bypassed the burglar alarm system, and who may have been the same ones who took \$500,000 in jewels from another jewelry store in January 1976.

The burglars overcame the alarm system by using a vacant apartment about 100 feet from the store to work on the telephone cables that led to system. Then they climbed an adjoining roof and entered the store by cutting through steel bars on the window of a second-floor washroom. They took what the police considered "marketable" items, including diamond rings, gold chains, watches and silverware.

(64)
December 1977

On a Thursday in December 1977, two gunmen held a bank manager and his wife and son overnight in the family's home in an unsuccessful attempt to rob a bank in the City of Industry, California. The thieves told the manager that if he failed to do what they said, they would kill his family. On the following Friday morning the robbers ordered the manager to go to his Bank of America office, draw out \$200,000, take it to a predetermined location, and wait there for further instructions.

When the manager arrived at the bank, he notified a security guard of the situation and the guard in turn notified the authorities. Detectives then staked out the drop location. The manager took the money to the site but the thieves never appeared. They had left the manager's home soon after the manager left for the bank, and disappeared. No one was harmed.

(65)
February 1978

On a Friday night in February 1978, six armed men broke into the home of the Wells Fargo manager of the office of the payroll protection service in suburban Longueuil, Quebec, Canada. Three of the robbers drove the manager's wife and two children away in a van, and the other three drove the manager to his branch office. There they forced him to open his safe and then made off with \$1 million in cash. The wife and children were released unharmed.

(66)
February 1978

Early on a bank day in February 1978, a lone gunman robbed the Park-Merced branch of the Crocker Bank in San Francisco of \$82,500 in small bills. The bandit carried a small caliber revolver, which police guess was a .22 or .25, and forced the bank manager to wear a walkie-talkie belt which he said contained dynamite that could be detonated by remote control.

The manager drove into the parking lot at 7:40 am and was approached by the gunman, who was on foot and carried a bag. The bandit forced the manager back into the car, took the belt out of his bag and ordered the manager to wear it. The two men then entered the bank. The robber did not know that it took both the manager and the operations officer to open the vault, so they had to wait for the operations officer. Shortly before 8:00 am she arrived along with two tellers, and all were escorted to the vault. The vault was opened and robbed. The gunman took the manager with him to the outer bank door, leaving the other three employees standing at the vault. Then he just walked away.

The walkie-talkie belt held road flares and batteries, nothing lethal. The robber did not appear to be disguising himself, although he was unshaven and wore regular glasses. The crime took 25 minutes.

(67)
March 1978

On a Tuesday in March 1978, four armed men robbed an armored truck in St. Jovite, Quebec, of \$1 million in cash. The four gunmen burst into a roadside diner and surprised three security guards, who had stopped for an early morning snack and left their truck unguarded.

On the following Thursday five men were arrested; two of them were veteran Canadian provincial police officers. Two suspects were still at large. The charges were: attempted murder, armed robbery, illegal possession of restricted firearms, disguising themselves for criminal purposes, assault with intent to injure, simple assault, and conspiracy.

All the money was found at a chalet in Ste. Sophie, near the site of the robbery. Also found there were seven handguns, a 12-gauge shotgun, a set of walkie-talkies, and six rubber masks.

(68)
April 13, 1978

On Thursday, April 13, 1978, three gunmen stole \$152,000 from Harrods, the fashionable London department store.

Two Harrods guards had gone down to the basement to collect part of the day's take when they were suddenly attacked by the robbers, who had apparently been hiding there. The robbers wore uniforms identical to those of the real guards (reminiscent of the 1950 Brink's robbery), and one of them fired blanks straight at the guards.

The attack threw the guards off balance. Then the thieves grabbed the money and ran upstairs, racing through the crowded store. Other Harrods guards tried to stop them, and in the ensuing fight one of the guards was hit over the head. He was later taken to a hospital with head injuries. The robbers managed to break free, fled through a rear door, jumped into a taxi and escaped. It wasn't known whether the taxi just happened to be there or was involved in the crime.

(69)
April 21, 1978

Between the early morning hours of 3 am and 6 am on Friday, April 21, 1978, two men burgled the Pitti Palace Museum in Florence, Italy, of 10 small Flemish paintings valued at over \$1 million. It was the first time the 15th century Pitti Palace of the Medicis' had ever been burgled. The most famous work taken was Ruben's "The Three Graces," which was insured for \$300,000--less than its real worth.

The thieves used a staircase or ladder to reach the museum roof from a courtyard. Then they broke a skylight and let themselves down a rope ladder into the Palatine wing. Security equipment was in the process of being installed in that wing but was not yet operational. Due to the size of the palace, the guards' route allowed the burglars two to three hours of freedom, and the thieves knew when to strike between rounds.

Two days after the crime all the paintings were recovered undamaged from the trunk of an attorney's car. Three men, the two thieves and the attorney, who allegedly commissioned them, were arrested. The burglars confessed, but the attorney denied any connection to the crime. Charges were theft and conspiracy.

The case was solved by the two thieves themselves, who spoke of the crime while in a public bar. Police searched their apartments and found undisclosed evidence which led to the attorney.

(70)
May 8, 1978

On Monday, May 8, 1978, six gunmen tied up three watchmen and broke into two strongrooms at London's Heathrow Airport. However, the robbery was mistimed. The strongrooms held nothing valuable, although, as the thieves probably knew, they usually contained millions of dollars worth of bullion, jewelry and currency.

(71)
May 1978

On a Friday night in May 1978, three masked and armed robbers stole an estimated \$400,000 worth of jewelry (mostly gold and diamonds) and antiques from Bergdorf Goodman's of Manhattan. The thieves apparently hid in the store before it closed and then emerged about 11:30 pm to overpower the lone night watchman. He was handcuffed to a staircase, his eyes were taped, and the key to an exit door was taken from him. The robbers left by that door which led to a street loading ramp.

Two of the robbers spent about an hour and a half ransacking two areas, fine jewelry and "Port of Call," which had one-of-a-kind items and antiques. All objects had price tags and the most expensive were taken.

The night watchman was discovered about 4:15 am by a porter.

(72)

June 1978

In June 1978 up to ten armed and at times masked raiders hijacked a bank security van in a remote area of West Limerick, Ireland, and stole about \$1,000,000 in cash. It was the largest theft ever in the "State" and was described as "lightning" and having a "military-style."

A Brink's Mat security van had been collecting money from many Munster banks and was transporting the cash to Limerick. The van held three guards. A squad car with two guards followed. At about 3:40 pm the convoy was stopped in a remote area by thieves armed with sawed-off shotguns, rifles and pistols. All the guards were ordered to lie down, and the radio and aerial of the squad car were smashed. It took the robbers three to four minutes to transfer the sacks of cash from the Brink's van into another van. A passerby happened to drive onto the scene. He was removed from his car, hit on the back, his keys taken, and then most of the thieves drove off in a Range Rover, believed hijacked from English tourists.

The robbers had placed diversionary signs on the road and had painted several small vans in county council colors. These vans were used to divert traffic from the scene of the crime. For no reason specified, the thieves had hijacked a lorry at about noon that same day. The thieves forced the driver to go home where they tied up his family and a neighbor. Perhaps the lorry was the "van" into which the sacks of money were placed, but this is unclear. In fact, yet another hijacked vehicle, a white Dodge van, was being searched for.

Though the robbers had both southern and northern accents, the Fine Gael Shadow Justice Minister said that the Government should have anticipated such a robbery because the drying up of funds from the United States "for subversive activities in Northern Ireland" was a matter of public record. In fact, the Government probably should have anticipated such a robbery because during the previous year more than one robbery a week had occurred during a six-month period. This theft equaled the total amount robbed in the previous year.

(73)

June 1978

On a Wednesday morning in June 1978, two men wearing stocking masks and carrying snub-nosed revolvers hijacked a truck/trailer carrying an estimated \$1.6 million in 4000 pounds of unrefined gold and silver. The robbery took place at about 6:00 am on Interstate 95 in Connecticut near the Rhode Island border as the metal was being transported to a refinery.

The driver said that he had stopped to check what he thought was a "defect" in the truck. He was then approached by the gunmen, who handcuffed and chained him to a tree and drove off

with the truck. He easily freed himself, was picked up by a passing motorist, and called police.

The truck was later found about 10 miles away, covered with brush, its cargo intact and the seal on the truck unbroken. The FBI stated that the unrefined metal would have been easy to dispose of, for example by selling to the jewelry industry.

A spokesman for the company that owned the truck stated that they had extensive security procedures and that these procedures had been circumvented in some manner. To be sure, the time and route of the trip was secret and the truck was carrying an unusually valuable load. However, there were no guards with the truck, only a driver, and a company truck with a cargo of some size drove daily to the refinery.

(74)

June 1978

On a Tuesday in June 1978, a truck carrying 13 French paintings worth \$3.5 million was stolen in Marseilles, France. The driver was returning the works to various museums that had lent them for a tour to Peking and Seoul. Ironically, the truck was stolen when the driver stopped and entered a cafe to ask directions to a police station where he might leave the truck under guard for the night. When he returned the truck was gone.

The vehicle was later found in a parking lot with only a \$30,000 painting aboard. Police speculated that the abandoned work by a local artist was too big to carry. It measured 4.5 by 7.4 feet. The other 12, including a Gauguin portrait, a Sisley landscape, and a Courbet landscape, were among 25 assembled for an exhibition titled "Landscapes and Peasants, French Country Life in the 19th Century."

(75)

July 1978

On a Thursday at about 10:00 am in July 1978, two gunmen surreptitiously hijacked a messenger service station wagon in the crowded heart of New York's financial district, taking the unarmed driver and his assistant. They ordered the car driven a few blocks away where they escaped into another car with \$5 million worth of securities, half of them negotiable. The robbery took about 10 minutes and neither messenger was harmed (the messengers were left in the station wagon).

A company spokesman stressed how difficult it might be to dispose of the bonds since the Security Information Corporation, recently created by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, checks all transactions to see whether bonds are stolen.

The station wagon was participating in open unguarded transportation of securities, with unobtrusiveness the key to success, which used to be popular in Wall Street. These days most transactions are done strictly on paper. The transportation firm involved in this robbery admitted that open movement of stocks and bonds is easy to detect.

(76)

August 18, 1978

On Friday, August 18, 1978, a young man attempted to steal three paintings, including Rembrandt's "Portrait of a Rabbi," from the M. H. de Young Museum in San Francisco's Golden Gate Park.

At about 11:40 pm a security guard answered the buzzer at the museum front door and found an unshaven man wearing dark clothes, sneakers and a knit cap. The man claimed to be a relief guard, but when the security guard refused him entrance, he drew what appeared to be a .45 automatic (it turned out to be a pellet gun). The guard let him in, and then the thief used masking tape to tie him and the real relief guard, who had appeared in the meantime, to a sink in the men's room. The thief then went into gallery 13, removed the Rembrandt, moved to the next room and picked up two other paintings, placing them all in a large plastic bag.

While doing this he was surprised by a third security guard. The thief, brandishing his gun, ushered that guard into the same men's room. There, in order to tie the guard up, the thief tucked his gun in his waistband. The guard lunged at him and knocked the gun to the floor. The thief broke loose and ran for the entrance, knocking down yet a fourth guard (the second relief guard). One of the guards emptied his .32 at the thief but apparently did not hit him since no blood was found. Police suspect that an accomplice may have been waiting outside in a vehicle.

The paintings were: Rembrandt's "Portrait of a Rabbi" worth more than \$1 million; Jan Brueghal the Elder's "Vase of Flowers" worth more than \$400,000; and Franz Pourbus' "Abraham Grauphas" worth about \$30,000.

Our latest information indicates that no one has been apprehended.

(77)

August 1978

On a Monday afternoon in August 1978, a Brink's guard was robbed of \$90,000 in checks and \$41,000 in cash in a service stairwell of the Sears store in the Buena Park Mall, California.

The guard had filled his satchel with the store's weekend receipts and was returning to his truck when the bandit stopped him and produced a gun. The bandit wore a hooded sweatshirt although his face showed plainly.

The odd thing about this holdup was that, although the robber showed no reluctance to speak, he used two signs to instruct the guard. The first, a sign taped to his arm, said, "Drop your gun or I'll shoot." The second, printed on cloth, said that Brink's would get back the checks (not negotiable except by Sears) if the robbery was not reported.

After taking the guard's gun, the gunman dumped the satchel contents into a trash bag, told the guard to stay put for five minutes, and fled with the guard at his heels. In the mall parking lot the bandit entered a car; the guard entered his truck and he and his partner proceeded to chase the car. They lost it but got a good description.

(78)
August 1978

On a Sunday morning in August 1978, three armed and masked thieves entered a millionaire's villa in Cannes through a skylight, tied a maid to a chair, and spent 30 minutes clearing the master bedroom of a fortune in jewels. At the time the owner was out having morning tea with friends. Police said the robbery "was a precision job by brazen professionals." This was the second robbery for the villa in three months. Previously, it was stripped of a collection of French paintings.

The Riviera seemingly swarms with thieves during the summer. In 1978 at least a dozen major jewel robberies were committed, the booty estimated at \$2.7 million. In one robbery the thieves disguised themselves as party guests. Hotels are also favorite targets; in 1978 police estimated an average hotel haul to be \$68,000. Rivieraans have a new name for these robbers and burglars who used to be called cat burglars. Now they're "monte en l'air"--climbers in the air, who use sophisticated mountaineering gear to scale villa walls.

(79)
August 1978

In August 1978 eight to ten thieves robbed an armored security van in a London suburb of \$1.4 million. They shot out the van's windshield, tires and radio, used a chainsaw to cut into the vehicle, and escaped with the money in 35 sacks.

(80)
September 1978

In September 1978 a wholesale jewelry firm in Belfast, Northern Ireland, that had not yet opened for business received a telephone call from someone claiming to be a reporter who wanted to do a story on the new firm. Around noon the caller and another man and a woman, also posing as reporters, rang the warehouse bell. They were admitted, then proceeded to tie up the owner and the manager, and escape with \$30,000 in cash and almost \$1 million in jewelry.

(81)
October 25, 1978

A man, who had worked at a Security Pacific National Bank branch in southern California as a computer programming consultant, allegedly swindled that bank of \$10.25 million on Wednesday, October 25, 1978.

In June 1978 he began to set up a future diamond purchase through a Swiss broker. On October 25 he entered the bank's wire-transfer room where the Federal Reserve Communication's System was used to transfer funds by cable. He knew how such transfers were effected. In the room he simply looked up the day's secret code, which must be included in any transfer. Late that afternoon he telephoned the transfer room, said he was a bank officer, gave the code, and had \$10.25 million transferred to his own account in New York.

On October 27 he flew to Geneva and picked up the diamonds. On October 29 he allegedly smuggled the diamonds into the U.S., simply telling Customs he had nothing to declare. On October 31 he visited his own attorney and confessed to, or perhaps bragged of, the theft. After he left, the attorney called the FBI. Security Pacific was informed of the crime by the FBI eight days after it was committed. They hadn't yet noticed the missing money mainly because their own backup checking system failed.

On November 1, the consultant flew to New York to set up a bona fide brokerage firm through which he could sell diamonds for cash. He gave a New York contact \$6,000 in good faith money to begin the business. But on November 3 the FBI and Security Pacific held a press conference, accused the consultant of the theft, and released his picture. The contact, realizing he had been duped, called the FBI.

On November 5 the consultant called New York and asked that the good faith money be sent to a post office box in Carlsbad, California. The FBI traced the box to an old friend of the consultant's. On November 6, 12 days after the crime, he was arrested at his friend's apartment.

The consultant was the first to show the potential damage an insider can do by penetrating the Fed wire system. He was indicted on four counts: transporting stolen property across state lines, entering a bank to commit a felony, fraud by wire, and smuggling goods into the United States. All the money was accounted for.

(82)
October 1978

On a Thursday at 9:00 pm in October 1978, two masked and gloved men carrying pistols and nightsticks entered the bachelor quarters in San Diego of a Navy ensign whose office contained a payroll safe. The ensign refused to give them his office keys and safe combination, so they beat him unconscious with the nightsticks. Then they bound and handcuffed him.

It is not clear whether the ensign finally gave the robbers what they wanted or if they found it by rummaging through his quarters. At any rate, one of the gunmen stayed to guard the ensign while the other went to the USS Dixon, the submarine tender where the ensign's office was. There he robbed the safe of about \$200,000 in cash. The gunman guarding the ensign left him at about 5:00 am on the following Friday morning. The ensign freed himself, called naval security, and was hospitalized.

The Navy suspects an inside job since the robbers knew that the ensign was living in bachelor quarters rather than onboard, the money was already in the safe for Monday's pay, where the ensign's office was located on the ship, and that the thief would have to pass through three security check points and produce identification containing his photograph (which he did). Evidently no one onboard remembered him.

The robbery took place when hundreds of civilians had been boarding the ship for overhaul work, but at the early hour of the theft probably less than a handful of civilians was onboard.

(83)
October 1978

In October 1978, four masked gunmen hijacked a mail truck near Attleboro, Massachusetts. The truck, which was from Providence, Rhode Island, and carried registered and unregistered mail plus gold and jewelry, was on a freeway ramp when two cars stopped in front of it, forcing it to halt. The robbers made the driver get out, handcuffed him to a chain-link fence, and then escaped with up to \$500,000 worth of the gold and jewelry. The truck was found abandoned soon afterward and authorities collected fingerprints from it.

(84)

November 1978

Over a weekend in November 1978, the Chief of Security at the Santa Barbara Museum of Art stole three Monet paintings from the museum. He later returned them and was arrested.

The man had become a museum security guard with no previous experience. In a short time he was promoted to Chief of Museum Security, a high-sounding but low-paying job. The museum housed (at least) three Monet oil paintings. It happened that the guard's father was an art teacher who painted in a Monet-like style. Police believe that as time passed father and son began to play with the idea of stealing the Monets and replacing them with copies good enough that no one would know a theft had taken place.

Over a weekend in November 1978 the Monets were stolen. Police assumed immediately this was an inside job because alarm systems and locking devices had been bypassed. The following Monday at the Museum Board's annual meeting, the guard appeared with the real Monets. He claimed he had talked the thieves into allowing him to return the paintings if he would not reveal the thieves' identities. Why had he not replaced the paintings with the fake copies as the police believe he planned to do? Theory has it that the frames, which were heavy, were irreparably damaged during the attempted replacement.

The guard was arrested immediately. An unsent letter from him to his father was found in the trunk of his car; it outlined the theft/replacement plans and incriminated the guard. However, neither the frames nor the copies nor any substantial evidence against the father was found and he was not arrested.

The stolen paintings were "Bordighera" (worth \$425,000), "Charing Cross Bridge" (\$285,000), and "Waterloo" (\$285,000). The guard pleaded guilty to this \$1 million crime in exchange for a sentence of not more than one year in jail.

(85)

December 1978

During December 1978, three oil paintings by Cezanne were removed from their frames and stolen from the Art Institute of Chicago by a male employee who later tried to sell them back to the Institute. The paintings were "Madame Cezanne in a Yellow Armchair," "Apples on a Tablecloth," and "House on the River." Together they were valued at \$2.5 to \$3 million, and they were insured.

Prior to the theft, the paintings had been in storage for 1-1/2 months while a gallery was being renovated for them. The storage room had a lock for which only a few employees possessed keys, and there were no signs of forced entry to that room or the museum. The employees with keys were questioned by the police and the FBI, who were unable to make any arrests.

Six months after the crime, a man who had formerly worked as a shipping clerk at the Institute went to museum officials claiming he had been asked to act as an intermediary for the person who had the paintings. For \$250,000 the museum could have the paintings back. In May 1979 at a Chicago hotel, the museum president paid the money to the former employee. While leaving the hotel the man was arrested; he was allegedly armed. The charges were felony theft and unlawful use of a weapon.

The man had been a suspect from the beginning. He had helped put the paintings in storage and had allegedly been seen in the storage area early one morning carrying a large flat parcel wrapped in paper. Police searched his apartment and found notes in a garbage can allegedly written by him and detailing anticipated problems in making a getaway from the museum. He had quit his job, which he had for about a year, shortly after he was questioned.

Security at the Institute was weak. The lock on the storage door was an ordinary house lock, and the area was not regularly patrolled. When the paintings were discovered missing on December 28, the storage area had not been checked for several weeks so that the exact date of the theft was impossible to ascertain. Anyone entering and leaving the museum is supposed to be checked by guards, but the Institute's Public Relations Director was quoted as saying: "I'm sure that there are times when a guard may know someone and doesn't check them as closely as you might hope."

(86)

December 11, 1978

At 3:00 am on Monday, December 11, 1978, \$5.8 million in cash and jewelry was stolen from the Lufthansa cargo terminal at the Kennedy International Airport. At that time it was the largest holdup in this nation's history.

About seven men wearing ski masks and driving a stolen van cut through the lock on the security fence surrounding the terminal, then drove up to the high-value vault inside the terminal. There they handcuffed about nine employees and forced the night manager to open the vault. They loaded the van and drove off. Soon after, an incoming employee saw what had happened and called the police.

The money, which was insured, consisted of \$5 million in used bills of small denominations and was considered untraceable. \$850,000 in jewelry was also removed from the vault by the thieves.

Because the thieves knew where the high-value vault was located, and because they seemed to know that the vault held an unusual amount of money, authorities correctly theorized that the job included inside help. A 10-year employee of Lufthansa who had gambling debts was believed by authorities to have originally suggested the robbery to a bookmaker.

Mainly through informants, police uncovered the names of eight who are believed to have participated in the actual crime. However, since the robbery, five people associated with it have been murdered and two have disappeared. Although all of the criminals involved were considered to be relatively small time, two had connections with an organized crime family. An hypothesis has it that the robbers had to pay the family for the privilege of committing the robbery, and it is likely that the money and jewels were filtered into "legitimate" businesses associated with the mob. Most of the loot was never recovered.

The employee suspect was arrested on February 20, 1979. He was charged with violation of the Hobbs Act--forceful theft from a company doing business in interstate commerce; theft from an interstate shipment; possession of goods taken from an interstate or foreign shipment--and conspiracy. Two other suspects, though not arrested for the crime, had their paroles revoked for associating with known criminals and were put back in jail. As of January 3, the employee is the only one to have been charged. He was tried and sentenced on May 16, 1979, to 16-1/2 years imprisonment. Although offered immunity, he refused to talk, apparently out of fear.

(87)
December 24-25, 1978

Between 5 pm on Sunday, Christmas Eve, and 9 am on Christmas Day, 1978, two or more burglars stole four paintings, including Rembrandt's "Portrait of a Rabbi," from the M. H. de Young Museum in San Francisco's Golden Gate Park. They entered the museum by unscrewing a skylight and lifting it out, then lowering themselves onto the catwalk or false ceiling 6- to 8-ft below, and removing a plastic grate. Then, possibly using a rope ladder, they lowered themselves to the floor and removed the paintings.

After they left and the crime was discovered, three other paintings, including another \$1 million Rembrandt, were found missing from the walls. They were left behind, evidently because the thieves shattered a lamp inside the crawl space causing glass to fall to the gallery floor. The noise probably frightened them off (although none of the guards heard it).

A man had been seen driving into the rear parking lot of the museum around 9 pm on Christmas Eve. He drove a station wagon which had an aluminum extension ladder tied to its luggage rack. It was speculated that the thieves gained access to the museum roof through a construction area where workers were modifying the building for the King Tut exhibit.

The stolen works were: Rembrandt's "Portrait of a Rabbi," worth more than \$1 million; DeLorme's "Interior of St. Laurence Church, Rotterdam," worth \$50,000; Van de Velde's "Harbor Scene," worth \$5,000; and Van de Neer's "Ruin Scene at Night," worth \$2,000. All of the paintings were taken in their frames, and none was insured.

Security at the de Young was poor and had not been improved after the first attempt on the "Rabbi" in August 1978. The entered skylight did not have an alarm. The two guards on duty did not routinely check the gallery that was burgled. However, since the breaking of the lamp was not heard and the theft was not discovered until 9 am, it was suspected that the guards did not make their rounds at all. (Most of the museum guards were low-paid CETA workers.) The museum housed some old infrared burglar detectors, easily bypassed by professional criminals, and magnetic door alarms, some costing less than \$2. Finally, one expensive system installed several years before that probably could have prevented the theft had been disconnected to save \$100 a month.

Our latest information indicates that no arrests have been made.

(88)

December 1978

At about 12:30 pm on a Tuesday in December 1978, 5 to 7 robbers armed with handguns and a shotgun stole \$2 to \$3 million in cash from a Wells Fargo armored truck. The truck, which had finished making cash pickups and was on its way to the Federal Reserve Bank in Manhattan, had stopped at a sandwich shop on Staten Island. Two guards entered the shop, which they frequented, while one remained in the truck. Three or four gunmen entered the store, disarmed and handcuffed the guards, and handcuffed seven other customers and four employees. One of the employees managed to set off a silent alarm by removing the last \$10 bill from the cash register. The people were then herded into back rooms and forced onto their knees.

The gunmen took the truck keys from the guards, went to the truck, overpowered the third guard, handcuffed him, and taped his mouth and eyes. They drove the truck with the guard in it a

few blocks and emptied the money, which was in bags, into a waiting car which had been seen earlier at the sandwich shop. Two other robbers may have joined them with the car. The third guard was left in the truck. Police arrived at the shop after the gunmen had left.

All the gunmen wore workclothes except one who wore a white medical coat. One had a false beard.

In May 1979, one man was arrested who was linked to the robbery through a fingerprint found on the steering wheel of the armored truck. He was charged with robbery, interference with interstate commerce, possession of stolen property, and conspiracy.

(89)

January 4, 1979

On Thursday, January 4, 1979, a Purolator Security, Inc., guard stole \$1.5 million in cash from the truck he was guarding. He later gave himself up.

The guard had worked for Purolator for four years; he had a wife and three stepchildren. On January 4, he and two other guards were picking up money from various branches of the Michigan National Bank to transport it by armored car to the Federal Reserve Bank in Detroit. At the time of the theft they were in fact carrying three bags of money, \$1.5 million in unmarked bills of small denominations.

They stopped at a restaurant in Lakeport, Michigan. The other two guards went in to eat while the third guard stayed in the car per company policy. When the two guards returned 45 minutes later the third guard and the money were gone. A note was found stating that he had taken the money and asking, naively, that the guards not call the police but give him time to get away. A day later he sent word through his attorney that he wanted to surrender to the FBI. He was picked up at his parents' home and arrested.

At the time this was Michigan's largest theft. It illustrates the difficulty of preparing for or preventing a crime by a trusted insider.

(90)

January 12, 1979

On Friday, January 12, 1979, two employees of Lufthansa Airlines impulsively decided to steal \$2.76 million from a cash shipment in an unguarded cargo truck at Frankfurt Airport in West Germany. The money was in four sacks. They were arrested, and

in June 1979 a court in Frankfurt found them guilty and sentenced them to 3-1/2 years in prison. All but about \$100,000 of the loot was recovered.

(91)

January 16, 1979

On Wednesday, January 16, 1979, two men in mechanics overalls and driving a stolen airport-marked Fiat truck or van stole about \$2.2 million in various foreign currencies from an outbound Swissair jetliner as it began taxiing for takeoff. The thieves broke a lock in the service hangar at Rome airport to get the truck, then communicated with the pilot by two-way radio, telling him they had to make a last-minute check for a possible fuel leak. When they got the OK, they sped up to the plane, opened its cargo area and stole two pouches containing the money which was being carried by courier. Then they gave the go-ahead for takeoff to the pilot and drove back the same way they came. They abandoned the truck outside the airport and sped away in a waiting car. Once the pilot was airborne he reported the incident to the Rome control tower and was told that no check had been ordered. Airport police and Swissair were informed. The robbery was discovered when the plane landed in Zurich.

The stolen money was part of regular cash consignments. An airline spokesman said he did not know why the courier had sent the pouches to cargo instead of hand-carrying them. A Rome security officer said the thieves knew the radio frequency of the control tower, cargo compartment mechanics, and how cars should be driven on runways. Therefore, airport detectives theorized that it was an inside job.

(92)

February 23, 1979

On Friday, February 23, 1979, a man and a woman rented a helicopter for what they apparently said would be a flight to Quebec City. However, upon takeoff they drew guns, then forced the pilot to land near a Royal Bank of Canada branch in a suburban St. Laurent shopping center. While one hijacker held the waiting helicopter, the other entered the bank and robbed it of \$12,000. An unconfirmed report had it that a second bank in the shopping center was also robbed. The thieves then ordered the pilot to fly to a nearby subway station, where they handcuffed him to his controls and then fled into the underground.

(93)
February 1979

At dawn sometime in February 1979, three masked men rushed into the Basilica of St. Mark in Venice as a lone watchman was opening its bronze door for morning mass. One of the men pistol-whipped the watchman, then the thieves rushed to an altar which held a revered tenth-century painting of the madonna inset with precious jewels. With a hammer they smashed the case containing the painting and grabbed the gems, damaging the artwork. The robbers then fled on foot. The 500 stolen diamonds and rubies were valued at \$1.2 million when they were appraised 10 years earlier.

The basilica was having its famous bronze horses exchanged for metal replicas at the time, but it is unknown if this was somehow related to the crime.

(94)
February 1979 and earlier

In February 1979 a former Beverly Hills businessman was arrested in New York and accused of masterminding a fraudulent gold futures scheme. His firm turned out to be a "boiler-room" operation employing 50 to 60 high-pressure salesmen and grossing between \$150,000 and \$200,000 a month. The company sold gold futures to thousands of investors across the country, telling them that the contracts for the future delivery of the gold were being held by a nonexistent bank in Luxembourg.

Only three years earlier the same man had been sentenced to prison for conspiracy, forgery, and attempted grand theft in a scheme to bilk the Los Angeles city treasury out of \$3.5 million by cashing stolen city checks. \$902,000 was never recovered and is assumed to be in European banks.

(95)
February 1979

In February 1979 \$2.75 million was stolen from a Lufthansa airliner as it flew from Sofia, Bulgaria, to Frankfurt, West Germany. In March 1979 three Lufthansa employees, and the wife of one of them and the brother of another, were arrested on suspicion of committing the crime. All but \$119,000 of the loot was recovered.

(96)
March 26, 1979

A reporter posed as a congressman, broke security, and gained access to the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty on the White House lawn on Monday, March 26, 1979. A House member had earlier told the reporter that, though all senators

and congressmen were invited, he was not going to attend the signing, and that no credentials had been issued for congressmen to be allowed to board special buses for the trip from the Capitol to the White House. When the day came and the House and Senate members converged on the buses, security officers had no time to perform the scheduled ID inspections. The reporter simply gave an officer the name of the congressman he knew would not be there, the officer checked the name off a congressional roster, and the reporter boarded the bus. He was never questioned again.

As the reporter put it, "All it took was one call, one question, a little observation and one lie to get a police-escorted ride to a first-class seat on the Executive Mansion's lawn--50 feet from the table where Mideast peace documents were signed."

(97)
March 1979

In March 1979, after a six-month investigation by the Postal Inspection Service, four members of the Sam Bailey Gang were arrested. The gang, which at times may have numbered 100, specialized in burglarizing small post offices in the Western states for the past 20 years.

Two of the four male suspects were arrested in Spokane, one in San Francisco, and one in Boise. They were charged with burglarizing post offices in Martinez, California, Ontario, California, and Kent, Washington, getting away with about \$262,000 worth of postage stamps, food coupons, currency, and migratory bird stamps. The stamps were fenced for about 80% of their face value, and the fence, a male who owned a coin company in Nevada, was also indicted at the time of the other arrests.

The group's burglary plans over the years had been sophisticated. They had employed experts for such tasks as electronic wiring, safe cracking, and tunneling. One of their systems was to deliberately set off an alarm several times a night for several nights to observe police reaction. Then when the alarm was shut down for service they'd attack. All in all the group stole \$400,000 worth of stamps.

(98)
March 1979

In March 1979 near the Cerrahpasa Hospital in Istanbul's old city, nine bandits with automatic weapons stole a hospital payroll worth about \$600,000. Because of a rash of recent thefts from security vehicles, the payroll had been disguised as a body and was being driven in an ambulance with a police escort. The

robbers, apparently with complete knowledge of the scheme, stopped two cars in front of the ambulance and its escort, opened fire in full view of hundreds of passersby, and took the loot, hidden in a suitcase under a blanket. One person died and several others were wounded in the shootout.

(99)

April 14-15, 1979

On Easter weekend in April 1979, burglars broke through the back door of the block-long postal terminal of Ottawa, Canada, and made off with about \$6 million in traveler's checks, jewelry, newly minted coin sets and passports. The traveler's check numbers were immediately distributed around the world; the checks totaled \$3.5 million of the haul.

The thieves, who moved 400 pounds of loot into a vehicle outside the terminal, left behind \$40 to \$50 million in gold bullion, stamps, jewelry, cash and drugs. The building had one guard on duty at the front, no alarm systems and no hourly checks. The guard was not aware of the burglary.

(100)

April 1979

At 9:20 am on a Wednesday in April 1979, three men wearing ski masks robbed a Bank of New York branch in the financial district of \$335,600 in cash. The cash had been delivered just 10 minutes earlier by a Purolator armored car to meet the payrolls of some neighborhood export-import companies.

The three men, dressed casually in dungarees and blue jackets, entered the bank and one of them stuck a gun in the ribs of a bank guard and disarmed him. No other guns were seen by the witnesses. As 15 employees watched, the two other men jumped over the counter where the vault was still open, and began loading the cash into two blue cloth drawstring bags. At this point, another bank employee entered and was ordered to lie on the floor. Less than four minutes after they entered, the men leaped back over the counter and walked out. They drove off in a car parked next to a fire hydrant. A bank employee reported its license number; it had been stolen on March 22.

Until recently, deliveries of currency to the bank had varied by day and hour. During the last month, however, it became routine for the money to be delivered early Wednesday mornings. Still, investigators believe that the thieves had inside help because they knew what time and where to go.

(101)
April 1979

On a Monday between 4:00 am and 7:00 am in April 1979, at least four robbers killed three Purolator guards at a Purolator depot in Waterbury, Connecticut, and made off with \$1.79 million. \$900,000 was in cash, \$66,000 in jewelry, and the rest in checks and food stamps.

Although reports conflict, the raid happened pretty much this way. The bandits waited outside the depot (it was probably raining) for a Purolator van carrying consignments for New York banks to enter the depot at 4:00 am. The garage door was closed and the depot guard and two drivers began loading the van with another consignment. One of the robbers threw a chunk of cement through a depot window, pointed a semiautomatic rifle in, and shot off nearly 50 rounds, killing the three guards. Then the thieves kicked in a wooden panel in the garage door, crawled into the depot, and took the loot. The garage safe, which contained \$2 million in cash, was untouched. An employee found the bodies at 7:15 am.

On the following Tuesday, less than 24 hours after the crime, police arrested two men and two women and recovered all the loot. One couple, married, was arrested at home in Wallingford, Connecticut. The other couple was arrested at home in Waterbury. The suspects were charged with: first-degree robbery, three counts of capital murder (Connecticut carries the death penalty), possession of marijuana, and possession of sawed-off shotguns. The suspects all had ties to a local motorcycle gang and the two males had lengthy records.

Police broke the case through a combination of an anonymous tip and old-fashioned street pounding, which included an interview that led to one of the suspects who had recently purchased a rifle. When the arrests were made, the police, who had earlier decided the robbery was an inside job, admitted that it wasn't. They do believe, however, that more than four may have taken part in the crime.

(102)
May 23, 1979

On Wednesday, May 23, 1979, four or five men in deliverymen's uniforms and driving a truck arrived at the Paris mansion of the ambassador of the United Arab Emirates in Europe, talked their way past the guards, then drew guns and proceeded to ransack the place. The ambassador was out of town at the time. The men stole about \$2.27 million worth of art objects, including numerous sculptures, paintings, and statuettes. No one was harmed.

(103)
May 1979

In May 1979 a man and a woman were arrested for fraudulently attempting to transfer \$2.8 million by wire from the Bank of Nova Scotia in Vancouver, British Columbia, to a Crocker National Bank in Century City, Los Angeles. The suspects, a salesman and a woman employee of a Vancouver branch of the Bank of Nova Scotia, were Canadian. The woman had access to the daily code required to make large wire transfers of funds and was arrested in Vancouver. The man was arrested at a hotel near Los Angeles International Airport.

The phone call intended to transfer the money was intercepted and no funds actually moved, because an FBI agent had infiltrated the operation. The male suspect had sought assistance in the scheme and had accepted the agent as someone with "insider" bank connections. The agent told the man that he had made arrangements with someone at a brokerage firm so that the money in the Canadian bank could be transferred to the account of the firm and then withdrawn in the form of bearer bonds.

This was the fourth incident of fraudulent wire transfer since such a crime was first committed in October 1978.

(104)
June 1979

At about 2:30 pm on a Monday in June 1979, a father and son, both Wells Fargo guards, robbed the armored car they were guarding of \$374,000 while it was en route from Ohio to Kentucky. Using their guns, they overcame the driver, then bound and gagged and left him, driving the truck away and later abandoning it. \$226,709 of the loot was in cash, \$138,179 in non-negotiable checks, and about \$9700 in food stamps. The robbers left a note in the truck expressing their distress at receiving only \$4/hr in wages from Wells Fargo.

The next day, Tuesday, police surrounded the home of a friend of theirs in Rochester, New York, where they were staying. After a 3-1/2 hour standoff the son tried to escape and was captured, and the father surrendered peacefully. In the house were found all the loot, six pistols, a sawed-off shotgun, knives and about 300 rounds of ammunition.

The father had worked for Wells Fargo for three years and had recently been promoted to captain. It was in this position that he processed an employment application for his son under an alias since the son had a criminal record in Rochester.

The Santa Barbara art theft of November 1978 was also a father/son job and the son was a security guard.

(105)
June 1979

In June 1979 three men were arrested for plotting to steal a \$2 million payroll shipment from a Brink's armored car at La Guardia Airport. Two of the men had taught actors to pick locks and open safes for the movie "The Brink's Job," and one had a bit part in the film. It was while shuttling between New York and Boston, where the film was being made, that the men noted the waiting Brink's car each Thursday at La Guardia and decided to rob it. The payroll, varying in amount from \$1 to \$6 million, was indeed shuttled from Boston every Thursday.

During a seven-week investigation, law enforcement officials filmed the men practicing the robbery--clocking the arrival of the Eastern Airlines flight, marking its position on the runway, noting the arrival of the Brink's truck, and clocking themselves opening doors and going out onto the runway. All three men had lengthy arrest records and the charge this time was conspiracy to commit armed robbery.

(106)
June 1979

In June 1979, burglars used the sewage system in Lecco, Italy, to reach the thick wall of an underground safe-deposit-box room of a bank, broke through the wall with pneumatic drills, and then escaped with millions of dollars worth of cash and jewels. They left behind some or all of the drills, blow torches, and skin diving equipment that they had apparently used to make their way through the sewage channel.

(107)
July 21-22, 1979

Over the weekend of July 21-22, 1979, \$600,000 in 60 stacks of \$10 bills disappeared from a safe in the money room of the New York City Transit Authority. Other subway revenue money was left behind in the safe, as well as monies in another safe and in vaults in the room. This second floor room is kept locked, is protected by electric alarms and metal bars and cages, the key to the room is kept in a safe, and it is located within a larger room that's guarded 24 hours a day by two guards. Also the safe that was robbed had a double combination--five employees and their supervisor knew "A" lock and five other employees and their supervisor knew "B" lock. The combination had last been changed six months before. According to the Assistant Director of Revenue, the Transit Authority had never been previously burgled.

The Transit Authority collects an average \$1.85 million daily from subway riders. On the Friday before the burglary, the receipts had been placed in the safe at 6:05 pm, too late, as usual, to deposit in the bank. The theft was discovered Monday at 9:37 am when the safe was opened. There was no sign of forced entry and the Authority said it was "probably an inside job." Visibility within the room is sometimes obscured by bars; windows, unbarred, open to outside streets; and the two guards cannot see the safe from their posts.

On Saturday July 21, a long-planned maintenance check had been held to test relay switches. Power was turned off between 1:25 and 2:20 pm. However, a third officer was assigned at that time, and all three guards had walkie-talkies and were unaffected by the power down.

(108)
July 28, 1979

On Saturday, July 28, 1979, a security company guard in Marseilles, France, celebrated his birthday by robbing his company of \$800,000 in that day's store receipts. Around 8:30 pm he disarmed three colleagues by offering to clean their revolvers. Then he handcuffed the men and locked them in an employee lounge. He knew the combination to the receipt room and how to disconnect the alarm system. Then he piled the money into several bags and drove away about midnight in a company car, doublecrossing two accomplices by fleeing alone. The accomplices were arrested but, although checkpoints were set up on every route out of Marseilles, the guard escaped.

(109)
July 1979

In Oviedo, Spain, on a Sunday in July 1979, a dozen robbers armed with pistols stormed the home of a bank manager, holding him and his wife and daughter hostage overnight. Then, with the manager, they drove in three cars to the manager's bank. They forced him to let them in, ordered the few bank employees to lie on the floor, and cleaned out the vault. Then an armored car arrived carrying a \$1.38 million payroll for a government coal mine. The robbers fired their pistols into the air and forced the guards to hand over the cash. They made off with a total of \$1.96 million. An alarm had been sounded during the robbery, but the thieves slipped through roadblocks and checkpoints that had been quickly set up.

Two abandoned cars used in the holdup were found to have been stolen by ETA (Basque Land and Liberty) urban guerrillas over the weekend, and the robbers had Basque accents. This was the biggest bank robbery in the history of Spain.

(110)
July 1979

In July 1979, two men, one dressed as a woman, allegedly robbed a Manhattan jewelry store of \$2 million worth of jewelry after pretending to want a necklace appraised. The loot included set and unset stones, bracelets, necklaces, and other jewelry. Police found the owner of the store and an employee handcuffed, but stated they did not know whether a holdup actually occurred.

(111)
August 3, 1979

On the Friday morning of August 3, 1979, four men wearing business suits and carrying handguns in their pockets and also leather bags, robbed a Rockefeller Center bank of \$500,000 in cash. They entered the Manhattan Bankers Trust Company branch at about 10:20 am and took an elevator to the vault area in the sub-basement. One man got off the elevator and approached an unarmed security guard about renting a safe deposit box. The guard told him that none was available so the man asked for an application form. When the guard opened the vault door, the man pulled out his gun, and his three accomplices came out of the elevator. The three women employees inside the vault and the security guard were told to lie on the floor, and the gunmen stuffed into their bags the cash that was being counted out to be sent up to the tellers.

The bank's cameras were activated during the robbery. By August 15 one of the men had been arrested, along with a teller. The teller had provided key information: that Friday would be a heavy cash day and the time the money would have left the vault and gone up to the tellers. The other three gunmen and most of the loot had not been found by August 15.

(112)
August 1979

On an afternoon in August 1979, three armed men wearing ski masks overpowered a guard and robbed over \$1 million in cash from a Brink's truck in the underground garage of the Chase Manhattan Bank's headquarters. The theft took place between 2:45 pm when the Brink's truck arrived at the bank and 4:00 pm when the men left with the money.

The gunmen had stolen a fish truck from a company which made regular deliveries to a restaurant in the bank building, and had driven it up to the guard booth of the lot. The truck was waved in by the guard who recognized it and recorded its license

plates. Meanwhile two of the three Brink's guards were in the process of loading some \$2 million from the Chase vaults into their truck. When they left for another load the assailants handcuffed the third guard and a restaurant employee, who happened to spot the gunmen, and herded them into the fish truck. Then they loaded 34 bags of money into the fish truck, leaving four bags behind, and drove off to a point near the Brooklyn Bridge. There they transferred the money to a Lincoln Continental and drove off, leaving the two captives locked in the back of the truck. The fact that they stole the correct truck and left four bags behind (perhaps a matter of timing the two guards who were loading consignments) indicates a thoroughly planned robbery.

(113)
September 1979

At about 2:20 pm on a Sunday afternoon in September 1979, an armored car, which had been left unguarded and locked but with its key in the ignition and its motor running, was hijacked from outside a Bronx supermarket and driven about a half mile away. There it was found about half an hour later without the \$228,651 in receipts from six earlier pickups. The truck's doors had not been forced and police speculated that the hijackers had followed the truck and used a master key to get in. An insider was suspected.

(114)
October 3, 1979

Around 5:30 pm on Wednesday, October 3, 1979, a man with locksmith experience used a key to open the front door of the empty First American National Bank of Nashville, Tennessee. No alarm was activated. In the ceiling above the night depository the man mounted a TV camera and videotape recording equipment, with the lens aimed at the vault's combination lock through a small hole in the acoustical ceiling. The man also mounted in the ceiling a battery power supply and digital timers. The following day the small hole in the ceiling was noticed and Security Alarms and Services, Inc., was called in to investigate. They found the sophisticated equipment and that no attempt had been made to defeat the security alarm system. The FBI was notified and began surveillance. At about 9:00 pm that night the man returned and was arrested. He was believed to be a fugitive.

(115)
October 30, 1979

On the night of Tuesday, October 30, 1979, a masked gunman broke into the home of the Bank of Commerce president in

Arlington, Texas, and held him, his wife and two children hostage overnight. The next morning at 7:00 am a business associate who had come to pick up the president was also taken hostage. The gunman then ordered the president to go to the bank, take \$250,000 from the vault, and return alone within 35 minutes or he would shoot the wife. The president did so. Then the gunman locked the president in the trunk of his own car. He freed himself about 10:00 am and called police, who set up roadblocks but did not catch the thief.

(116)
October 1979

On a Thursday morning in October 1979, four men robbed a Los Angeles jewelry store of \$750,000 in uncut diamonds, rings, gold and cash.

At 9:30 am two of the men hijacked a UPS truck, tied up the driver and transferred her into a stolen van parked near the jewelry store. She was guarded there by two other men who sexually assaulted her. The first two men, wearing parcel service uniforms, drove the UPS truck to the jewelry store. There they handcuffed the owner and his wife and gathered the loot in less than 15 minutes. They left in the truck, abandoning it several blocks away for a new sports car. Then they drove back to the stolen van, picked up their accomplices, and fled in two cars.

(117)
November 11, 1979

At midday on Sunday, November 11, 1979, it was discovered that burglars had stolen 1500 diamond-studded Lucian Piccard watches from Arnex Industries Corp. in Carlstadt, New Jersey. The watches, which were kept in a production and storage vault, had a retail value of \$6.3 million, and a wholesale value of \$2.1 million. Arnex is the sole American producer and distributor of Piccard watches.

The thieves cut security alarm lines at the company which knocked out hundreds of burglar alarms, and also cut main telephone lines that disrupted police department telephones in three New Jersey towns.

(118)
November 1979

Over a weekend in November 1979, about \$1 million in cash and checks disappeared from the Raritan Arsenal branch of the First National State Bank, Edison, New Jersey. The checks were

non-negotiable. An FBI spokesman said that there was no sign of forced entry, combinations had to be known, and knowledge of the alarm system and keys had to be obtained. An inside job was thus suspected. The receipts had been picked up from department stores on Saturday by an armored car and deposited in the bank vault. When employees opened the vault on Monday the money was gone.

(119)

December 18, 1979

At about 8:30 am on Tuesday, December 18, 1979, five men attempted to rob a jewelry store in New York City after taking 17 hostages there. They had planned to take \$2 million in jewelry from the store vault. However, police, who had been tailing the mastermind because they suspected him of an earlier robbery, were told by an informer when and where the holdup was to take place. Fifteen detectives broke it up at about 9:00 am.

One of the thieves dressed as a security guard with gloves and the other three wore ski masks. They carried among them two large suitcases, four loaded guns and 20 pairs of handcuffs. They handcuffed and also taped the eyes of everyone who entered the building, waiting for a jewelry store employee who could open the showroom and the vault. At least three of the thieves were ex-cons; one of them escaped in a car but police thought they knew who he was. The charges were: attempted murder, kidnapping, attempted robbery, conspiracy, and possession of loaded guns.

There was a tense moment when the detectives entered the store and one of the thieves aimed his gun at them. He did not shoot, however, but the detective he was aiming at fired a shot into the ceiling to distract him. Police had warned the jewelry store that they thought a robbery would take place that day.

(120)

December 18, 1979

On Tuesday, December 18, 1979, a man entered the office of the regional manager of the Bank of California in Los Angeles, drew a handgun, and forced the manager to don an athletic supporter which he said contained a bomb. He then forced the manager to phone one of the bank's operations officers and tell her to bring \$300,000 in 10s, 20s, 50s and 100s to the manager's office. The operations officer asked the manager, "Do you have a gun at your head?" to which the manager replied, "Yes." She phoned the FBI, then delivered the money. The gunman and the manager left in a car driven by the manager, and were followed by the police. The manager was let out at the Music Center and the gunman was arrested at the next traffic light. The loot was recovered. The charges were bank robbery and making threats against a federally chartered bank for purposes of extortion.

The bomb squad took the manager to a semi-isolated overpass and removed the athletic supporter. The "bomb" turned out to be nonlethal--simply a digital clock hooked with wires to a lump of clay.

This theft was similar to one that took place in San Francisco in February 1978, when a bank manager was forced by a lone robber to wear a walkie-talkie belt containing a dummy bomb.

(121)
January 1980

At about 11:00 pm on a Friday in January 1980, two gunmen climbed a 10-foot chain-link fence topped by barbed wire to enter a Brooklyn shipyard. There they accosted a security guard, handcuffed and blindfolded him, and then took him on a 5-hour drive around New York. Meanwhile, confederates who were never seen stole two 20-foot long, 8-foot high, 8-foot wide containers of tin ingots worth \$500,000 from the shipyard. The size of the containers, which weighed nearly 60,000 pounds, was supposed to prevent pilferage. At 4:00 am the guard, unharmed, was handcuffed to a parked car in Queens, about 10 miles from the shipyard.

Police thought that the job must have required five or six robbers, at least one tractor-truck, and inside information about the tin, which had arrived from Brazil the previous week. Four security men were on duty that night, but because of the size of the yards--an 8-block tract of piers, warehouses and storage areas--the three other guards noticed nothing.

Tin is used in a variety of manufacturing processes and its price had risen previous to the robbery.

